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During much of the twentieth century, civil processes in the
United States relied on a conceptual framework anchored in the
constitutional and common law of due process. More recently, the
case law looks to doctrines of contract and agency law to enforce
contracts to preclude litigation and to encourage the entry of con-
tracts to conclude litigation. While "bargaining in the shadow of
the law" is a phrase often invoked, bargaining is increasingly a re-
quirement of the law of conflict resolution, both civil and criminal.
Therefore, analyses of the meaning of agreements, familiar features
of the law of contract, are becoming central elements of the new law
of Civil Procedure.
* Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. © Judith Resnik.
Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this
article at or below cost for educational purposes as long as each copy identifies the
author as the copyright holder, provides citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and
includes this provision and copyright notice.
My thanks to Jean Stemlight who, on behalf of the Section on Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR), joined me as Chair of the Section on Civil Procedure in
convening ajoint program for the American Association of Law Schools in the winter
of 2004 on the relationship between classes on Procedure and those on ADR. This
article relates to ideas that I discuss in the chapter Contracting Procedure, forthcoming
in LAw MADE IN SKYBOXES: TRENDS IN AMERICAN LAw (Paul D. Carrington & Trina
Jones eds., NYU Press 2005) and in Civil Processes, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
STUDIES 748 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) as well as in the articles
Procedure's Projects, 23 CIVLJUSTICE QUARTERLY 273 (2004) (in a Symposium published
in the United Kingdom by Sweet and Maxwell and edited by Adrian Zuckerman), For
Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 1701 (2004), and Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article Ill, 113 HARv. L. REv. 924 (2000). Thanks for research assistance are owed to
Gene Coakley, whose librarian skills are unparalleled, and to Paige Herwig, Joseph
Blocher, Andrew Goldstein, Alison Mackenzie, Jennifer Peresie, Bertrall Ross, and
Steven Wu, all unusually able Yale Law School students. Discussions with Denny
Curtis, Janet Alexander, Richard Brooks, Paul Carrington, Owen Fiss, Vicki Jackson,
Lee Rosenthal, and Amy Schulman have helped me to sharpen the points engaged
here, as did Helen Hershkoff's and Jean Sternlight's responses to an earlier draft of
this article.
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As a consequence, debate needs to center on what the law of
"Contract Procedure" should provide. Central questions include
whether parties ought to be able to contract for jurisdiction (both
state and federal), for choice-of-law rules, and for privacy. Contract
Procedure needs also to decide how to regulate the role of judges
(who sometimes participate in shaping civil bargains) and what
rights parties have when post-agreement conflicts arise either about
the existence of a settlement or about the meaning of its terms. As
Contract Procedure supplements and sometimes supplants "Due
Process Procedure," the rules of bargaining for legally binding judg-
ments need to identify what bargains law cannot abide.
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1. THE LAW OF PROCESS AS A LAW OF BARGAINS
In the 1940s, in the wake of the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, law professors began to fashion courses
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around that then-new set of national rules.' Now, more than sixty
years later, the Rules no longer suffice as a unifying theme. Court-
based processes have come to incorporate what some style their "alter-
natives"-dispute resolution focused on negotiation rather than on
adjudication. In addition to encouraging the entry of contracts as a
means of concluding litigation without adjudication, courts also en-
force contracts that preclude litigation. While "bargaining in the
shadow of the law" is a phrase often invoked, 2 bargaining is increas-
ingly either a requirement of the law of conflict resolution or the ex-
pected means of concluding disputes, both civil and criminal. As a
consequence, today's "Civil Procedure" classes need not only to un-
derstand rules focused on adjudication but also the rights and obliga-
tions of those who agree to settle cases. Further, both rules of process
and courses about process need to address how court-based concilia-
I SeeJames Wm. Moore, The Place of the New Federal Rules in the Law School Curricu-
lum, 27 GEO. L.J. 884, 884-85 (1939); Mary Brigid McManamon, The History of the Civil
Procedure Course: A Study in Evolving Pedagogy, 30 Amz. ST. L.J. 397, 402-03 (1998).
Professor McManamon's article was prompted by a 1998 Conference on Civil Proce-
dure, sponsored by the American Association of Law Schools (AALS). In it, she traces
the emergence of a federal rule-based course, supplanting the prior focus on plead-
ing and equity. Id. at 397-422. From a contemporary lens, an interesting aspect of
her account is the call, in the 1920s, by an AALS Committee on the Reform of Legal
Procedure, for the development of a new course that would include various procedu-
ral models, both domestic and comparative. Id. at 426-27. Specifically, that Commit-
tee called for the teaching of "Modern Procedural Methods," and that the Association
help create a "Source Book on Modern Procedural Methods" to include English legis-
lation, certain exemplary State procedural codes, the then-new Federal Equity Rules,
and information on a range of courts, including Ecclesiastical and Equity Courts, as
well as information on procedure in "Roman, Scotch, French, and German Courts."
Report of the Committee on the Reform of Legal Procedure, in HANDBOOK OF THE AMERCAN
ASSOCIATION OF LAw SCHOOLS AND PROCEEDINGS 57, 59-60 (1920). The Committee
also argued that law schools spent too much time on "adjective law," but should con-
tinue to do so until procedural reform, that was "imperative," had taken place. Id. at
57.
In McManamon's account, Richard H. Field and Benjamin Kaplan are credited
with creating the paradigmatic Civil Procedure casebook, published for the first time
in the same year that Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler published the first edition of
their book, Federal Courts and the Federal System. McManamon, supra, at 435. Some of
the history and philosophy of the development of the Federal Courts curriculum can
be found in Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of Federal
Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1021, 1022-32
(1994), and in Richard Fallon, Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND.
L. REv. 953, 956-69 (1993).
2 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
2005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tion affects the role of the judge, the rights of the parties, and the
functioning of courts.
Here, I offer a brief overview of the last six decades of civil proce-
dural reforms to map the movement towards contract and to examine
some of its implications. As I will detail, beginning after the promul-
gation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the late 1930s,3 law-
yers, judges, and law school classes centered on those Rules, which
served as a basis for many state reforms as well. The Federal Rules
both symbolized a national commitment to rights-seeking as a useful
form of social norm development and constituted the great procedu-
ral reform project of the twentieth century. These trans-substantive
rules offered uniformity across diverse subject matters and across the
country.
As practitioners, judges, and teachers explored the Rules' text
and purposes-oudining the steps by which parties litigated and
judges decided cases-the conceptual backdrop was the constitutional
and common law of due process. From questions about the standards
to be applied when ruling on various motions to the standards for
reaching judgments on the merits, the issues were the same: How
could fair decisions be achieved? What kind and quantum of informa-
tion sufficed to render binding judgments that had law's force behind
them? How much process was due?4
3 Rules of Civil Procedure, 308 U.S. 645 (submitted in 1937 to be effective in
1938) [hereinafter 1938 Federal Rules].
4 A series of decisions (some based on statutory provisions and others interpret-
ing the "due process" requirements of the United States Constitution) have sorted
litigants, offering some of them more process than others and justifying the a!loca-
tions through estimations and intuitions about the costs, benefits, forms of error, and
marginal utilities of oral presentations, written documentation, and legal representa-
tion. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). Further, the Supreme Court has elaborated different tests to decide what
quantum of process is "due" by distinguishing between state criminal proceedings and
administrative decisionmaking. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992); see
also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (2004) (applying the Mathews v. Eldridge
test to assess the quantum of process to be provided to citizens alleged to be enemy
combatants and doing so by comparing the private interest at stake, the Govern-
ment's interests, and the burdens imposed by adding more procedural predicates).
Further, the Court has fashioned one test of the adequacy of process when a civil
litigant claims a due process right to counsel and another when a civil litigant asserts a
right to timely notice. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981);
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002). The analytic problems are many, as
in some sense whatever amalgam of processes required is deemed that which is "due,"
given the nature of the interests at stake. Further, much of the current approach is
narrowly focused on only the value of achieving accuracy and moreover makes such
assessments often without requisite information on the costs of current and additional
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The practices of adjudication, however, have shifted.5 As is also
outlined below, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) or dispute reso-
lution (DR) increasingly dominates the landscape of procedure. That
such a change has occurred can be seen in amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure which, as initially promulgated in 1938,
did not use the word "settlement" in their text. Today, that word ap-
pears four times, as judges are charged with encouraging litigants to
end their disputes through contracts for dismissal or judgment.
Processes of mediation and arbitration that rulemakers described as
"extrajudicial '6 only two decades ago have been brought inside courts,
thereby changing that which is 'judicial."
In addition to the internalization of contract norms, judges who
once were skeptical of devolution of judicial authority to agency
factfinders now permit the reallocation of adjudication to government
officials working outside courthouses. Further, federal judges who
once had declined to enforce ex ante agreements to arbitrate federal
statutory rights now generally insist on holding parties to such bar-
gains, thereby outsourcing an array of claims. As a result, mini-codes
of civil procedure are being created by courts, agencies, and a multi-
tude of private providers. The aspiration for a trans-substantive proce-
dural regime embedded in the Federal Rules has been supplanted by
an array of contextualized processes.
With the predicate presumption that parties' agreements validate
outcomes, the attention paid to the quality and kind of process pro-
vided is waning. Instead of questions about the process "due," the
issues are about when an enforceable settlement has been achieved,
who has the power to bind whom, whether courts should refuse cer-
tain of the bargains struck, and which court has jurisdiction to enforce
settlements when disputes arise.
As a consequence, the distinctive elements of adjudication as a
form of "social ordering" to be contrasted with other forms, such as
contracts and elections (to borrow Lon Fuller's categories) ,7 are di-
processes or of the costs and rate of errors under a given procedural regime. See
generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus in Mathews v. El-
dridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
5 This phenomenon is not limited to the United States. See HILARv ASTOR &
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AUSTRALIA (2d ed. 2002); AndrewJ. Can-
non, A Pluralism of Private Courts, 23 CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 273 (2004).
6 See FED. R. Clv. P. 16 (as amended in 1983) and its accompanying notes, dis-
cussed infra notes 66-77.
7 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 363
(1978). This essay was published posthumously and was based on materials written
initially in the late 1950s.
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minishing. While Procedure was once concerned about generating
secondary rules by which to render judgment, today the task is to
shape secondary rules for interpreting parties' agreements and,
hence, my description of a shift from Due Process Procedure to Contract
Procedure. I use the word "contract" here to refer both to government-
based encouragement of dispute resolution through contract and to
government enforcement of parties' agreements to contract out of
litigation.
Questions of legitimacy and fairness-once raised in terms of
how to render judgment-now need to be redirected towards bargain-
ing processes promoted by courts, agencies, Congress, and private
providers. Just as inequalities of access and disparities of resources
between adversarial parties in court-based adjudication generate
problems for the Due Process Model of Procedure, so do unequal bar-
gaining positions raise questions for outcomes generated through
contract. Further, Contract Procedure raises acute challenges to the
very idea of the judge, asked not to decide ("to judge") but, as one
appellate court recently explained, to "encourage settlements and to
poke and prod reluctant parties to compromise, especially when their
differences are not great and/or their claims or defenses are not
airtight."8
In addition, in the context of class actions and certain other kinds
of cases, those same judges are also asked to approve the settlements
reached. Thereafter, if and when bargains fall apart, litigants return
to the very same judge for enforcement. The pressures on trial judges
to help bring about and to accept settlements are acute, as can be
seen through major Supreme Court decisions disapproving large-scale
settlements.9 A spate of lower court cases (discussed below) also
demonstrate that, in ordinary cases, comparable problems exist as ne-
gotiations occur in hurried, pressured settings in which discussions
and conclusions reached by lawyers, judges, and the parties are not
often recorded.
Judges are beginning to consider whether to structure bargain-
ing, when to decline to enforce certain terms of settlement agree-
ments, and what kind of process ought to be accorded-in which
jurisdiction-when signatories to settlements disagree about whether
and what agreements were forged. Similarly, case law is starting to
emerge assessing the quality of process provided through private dis-
pute resolution programs required by increasing numbers of contracts
8 Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2001).
9 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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for a range of goods and services and for various types of
employment.10
A good deal of the contemporary doctrine on Contract Proce-
dure assumes the wholesale application of extant principles of con-
tract law. In contrast, I argue that court-based bargaining ought not
necessarily inherit ordinary rules of contract law. Rather, because
court-based contracts have third-party effects (most readily apparent
in the context of aggregate litigation but relevant in smaller scale
cases as well), the task is to tailor contract principles to the particular
and peculiar instance of contracts sparked by (and sometimes ham-
mered out through) judicial advocacy of settlement.
Thus, my argument is fourfold. First, that which "is" Procedure
and that which adjudication entails have changed, and contemporary
scholars and teachers of Procedure need to focus on both Due Pro-
cess and Contract Procedure in their work and courses. Second, law
needs to address how contracts made through state-based promotion
of conciliation differ from those reached by individuals or entities
coming together before disputes arise. Third, the law that should
evolve has to take on the job of regulating both judges and con-
tracting parties. In light of the legal ability to use settlement contracts
as vehicles to generate court enforcement, courts should refuse to
sanction certain kinds of bargains. Moreover, the job of regulation
ought not to be left only to case law. Given that statutory and rule-
based mandates for judges to manage and to settle are plentiful and
the normative questions substantial,11 directions from state and fed-
eral legislators and rulemakers about how to do so for managerial and
settling judges ought to articulate how 'judicious" judges are to be-
have in these new roles.
Fourth, and finally, Contract Procedure cannot escape Due Pro-
cess Procedure. Under doctrines licensing contracts to displace adju-
dication, judges are charged with assessing whether the alternatives
provide fora in which disputants can effectively vindicate their
rights. 12 As we are beginning to see from lower court cases challeng-
10 See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55 (2004) (studying the frequency of such contracts in sectors of the econ-
omy); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 75 (2004) (evaluating such clauses that also seek to preclude class actions).
11 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HAv. L. REV. 374, 391-403 (1982)
[hereinafter Resnik, Managerial judges].
12 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28-32 (1991).
Cases often arise when disputants seek to enforce arbitration obligations under the
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ing the quality of privately-based arbitrations, the replacement of pub-
lic processes with private ones brings judges into assessing the
qualities of these alternative processes. To be acceptable, those
processes have to look more like what courts do than not. Similarly, as
court-based bargains fall apart and post-settlement disputes become
more frequent, judges are beginning to articulate their obligation to
return to a Due Process Model of Procedure to decide the respective
rights of disputing settlers. In short, while the trans-substantive re-
gime of the Federal Rules has ended, a trans-substantive role for
judges-anchored in due process-remains.
II. EXPANDING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, PROMULGATING FEDERAL
RULES, AND DEVELOPING DUE PROCESS PROCEDURE
In 1922, Congress began a century-long project to expand federal
judicial capacity through increasing the number of judicial officers,
the kind and array of federal rights, and the power of the federal judi-
ciary to make national procedural rules.13 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure gave federal judges a set of rules to share, moving their
affiliation towards each other rather than conforming their practices
to the different states in which they sat. National rules of criminal
procedure, appellate procedure, and evidence followed in the de-
cades thereafter.
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The Supreme Court has developed a layered ap-
proach, requiring inquiry into whether parties in fact agreed to arbitrate, whether a
particular dispute is covered under the FAA and if so whether, nevertheless, a particu-
lar federal statute provides an exemption to such coverage, and finally whether the
alternative forum provides an adequate alternative for effective vindication of federal
rights. Federal adjudication serves as a baseline, and substantial deviations (such as
much greater impositions of costs on the party invoking federal statutory protection)
can result in nonenforcement of arbitration contracts. Controversy currently centers
about whether federal pro-arbitration policies preempt state contract law, including
state rulings finding contracts to arbitrate unenforceable if they preclude class action
arbitrations. Compare Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393 (App.
2003) with Mandel v. Household Bank, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380 (App. 2003), both pend-
ing on review before the California Supreme Court. See ADRWorld.com, Scrutiny of
Class Action Bars in Arbitration Clauses Mounts, at http://www.adrworld.com (Nov. 18,
2004); notes 226-227, infra.
13 See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, Pub. L. No. 67-298, 42 Stat. 837. In 1934,
Congress authorized the United States Supreme Court to promulgate federal proce-
dural rules that had the power to displace local practices with national norms. Rules
Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)). The classic articles on their creation are Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Per-
spective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 943-45, 955 (1987), and Stephen B. Burbank, The
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982).
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While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are now both taken
for granted and subject to substantial criticism, their creation was
once an event of great import, widely celebrated and imitated. As
Charles Clark, one of the drafters, claimed: "with its permeation into
the daily professional life of all lawyers and its reshaping of law school
curricula and teaching," the creation of national federal procedural
rules was a project of heroic proportions ("one of the major turning
points of English and American legal history") .14 The normative in-
struction provided by these rules shared themes with other legal
projects of that era, welcoming of national government regulation
and seeing fact-based inquiries as useful methods to achieve just
results. 15
As is familiar to Procedure teachers, in those then-new federal
rules, lawyers and law professors shaped a trans-substantive code
aimed at simplifying process, easing access to courts, and collapsing
distinctions between law and equity. 16 With their flexible, equity-
based approach and their diminished formalism, these rules endowed
trial judges with a good deal of discretion to tailor processes to the
circumstances of a particular case.
But the Rules also channeled and constrained that discretion.
1 7
In their initial formulation, judges were not much involved in super-
vising discovery, nor were they charged with structuring the timing of
the filing of motions. Further, when parties sought judicial decision-
making, judges were required to apply standards set forth in rules
(often amplified by case law) to determine whether cases could pro-
ceed to adjudication. Dispositive decisions were to be explained by
findings of fact and conclusions of law.'
8
14 Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SoC'¥ 250, 254 (1963).
15 SeeJudith Resnik, Procedure's Projects, 23 CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 273 (Adrian
Zuckerman ed., Symposium Volume, Sweet and Maxwell 2004).
16 Congress had given the Supreme Court the power to make rules, and the
Court in turn appointed a committee of lawyers and law professors who did the draft-
ing. SeeAppointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules,
295 U.S. 774 (1935). That Committee made the decision to create a uniform set of
rules for both law and equity. See Charles E. Clark &James Wm. Moore, A New Federal
Civil Procedure Part I: The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 432-35 (1935); Part II: Pleadings
and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1292-99 (1935). Over the decades, judges increasingly
dominated the drafting process. See infra note 83 and the accompanying discussion.
17 As Sanford Kadish explained, the law and theory of due process entails "fixity"
and "flexibility." Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudica-
tion-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 320 (1957).
18 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b); FED. R. Crv. P. 56(d). See generally Arthur R. Miller,
The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis, "and Efficiency
20051
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The Rules also gave federal judges a new environment in which
to work. These national processes united federal judges dispersed
around the country by linking them through shared daily practices.
The Rules helped lower federal judges to shape an identity as a dis-
tinctive cadre of legal actors gaining a high profile through rulings on
school desegregation, antitrust, and criminal defendants' rights. As
they shared a growing docket, elaborated doctrine, and worked under
the same rules, federal judges came to see themselves as in need of
their own management structure and as obliged to socialize new en-
trants into their distinctive ways. Institutions (such as the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts and the Federal Judicial
Center), programs (including "schools for judges"), and agendas (a
Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts) all followed. 19
The Rules, expressive of and coupled with an impressive invest-
ment in the infrastructure of the federal courts, represent a normative
commitment to federal regulatory power. In the wake of the Depres-
sion, many saw federal governance as a necessary and desirable re-
sponse to political and economic conditions. The expansion of
federal jurisdiction and uniform federal processes were mechanisms
by which to enforce the developing national legal regime. Time and
again, Congress authorized government officials and private parties to
bring lawsuits as a means of enforcing federal law. Federal procedure
thus needs to be understood as a part of a larger national constitu-
tional project, relying in part on equipping individuals and groups to
come to court as rights-seekers and upon judges to determine the ob-
ligations of disputants.
That attitude towards process can be seen in the major wave of
amendments to the Federal Rules that occurred in the 1970s. The
expansion of the class action rule is exemplary of widespread affection
for entrepreneurial rights-seeking. Not only did the Rules invite "pri-
vate attorneys general" to bring lawsuits on behalf of groups to en-
force public norms, but its approach was mirrored in a smorgasbord
of other mechanisms. Congress gave government officials new au-
thority to bring lawsuits, and private parties gained new incentives
through fee-shifting statutes to pursue claims against both public and
Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Juiy Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982
(2003).
19 SeeJudith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article 11, 113 HARv. L. REV. 924, 937-57 (2000); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies:
The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 272-91 (2003).
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private wrongdoers. 20 The 1966 class action rule, complemented by
statutes authorizing consolidation across federal district courts21 and
fee-shifting provisions, reshaped ideas about what litigation might
accomplish.
22
The import of the Rules-as a vehicle for adjudication's expan-
sion-can be mapped through their facilitating implementation of
new federal rights, the filing of more kinds of cases, the growing sizes
of dockets, and the funding of the federal courts. Congress author-
ized litigants to bring lawsuits aimed at enforcing civil rights, environ-
mental rights, consumers' rights, and workers' rights, and Congress
enlarged the power of federal prosecutors to pursue criminal actions.
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, caseloads within the federal system
tripled, as hundreds of new statutory causes of action were enacted.
In terms of budgets, Congress provided substantial resources to the
federal courts, whose budget grew from about $250 million in the
early 1960s to its current $4.2 billion. 23
But even that largesse could not respond to all those eligible for
adjudication under federal law. Further, neither Congress nor Article
III judges were interested in augmenting the ranks of life-tenured Ar-
ticle III judges in numbers sufficient to decide all the kinds of cases
that federal lawmakers had permitted. Leaders of the bench and bar
instead created new kinds ofjudges and new venues for judging, both
within and outside of the federal courts. Some of these auxiliary
judges-magistrate and bankruptcy judges-are appointed by Article
20 See generally Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating
Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 2119 (2000).
21 See Multidistrict Litigation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000)).
22 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (1966). See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of
the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 21 (1996);Judith Resnik, From Cases to Litiga-
tion, 54 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).
23 SeeJudith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Norma-
tive Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783 (2004)
(discussing the wealth of the federal courts as compared to the state courts and ad-
ministrative courts) [hereinafter Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing]; Marc
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, I J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 501, 505 & fig.31 (2004) [hereinafter
Galanter, Vanishing Trial] (discussing and graphing the growth of judicial expendi-
tures on the federal courts from $246 million in 1962 to $4.254 billion-both in 1996
dollar values-over a thirty year span).
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III judges, work inside Article III courts, and serve fixed and renewa-
ble terms.
2 4
Others, called Administrative LawJudges (ALJs), obtain their ap-
pointments by competitive exams and gain some degree of indepen-
dence by virtue of the Administrative Procedure Act, first enacted in
1946 by Congress to regularize and unify federal administrative proce-
dure. 25 Many agencies (including the Social Security Administration,
the Veterans Administration, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and the Immigration Service doing its adjudicatory work
inside the Department of Justice) have become significant, albeit low
visibility, adjudicatory centers employing hundreds of judges. 26 In
terms of the number of cases, the filings of claims inside agencies are
in the hundreds of thousands. In terms of the number of adversarial
proceedings, my estimate from the dockets of the four high-volume
federal agencies mentioned above is that, in total, these four agencies
hold about three-quarters of a million hearings yearly.
27
24 SeeJudith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice": Inventing the Federal District
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. LJ. 607,
614-15 (2002) [hereinafter Resnik, Inventing the Federal District Courts].
25 See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000)).
26 Their numbers overshadow those of the life-tenured judiciary, as some 1500 to
2000 ALJs are joined by a roughly equal number of other agency employees ("admin-
istrative judges" or "hearing officers") who are line-employees and do their adjudica-
tory work outside the strictures of the APA. The growing powers of such judges have
sparked controversy because these hearing officers lack structural independence, as
well as interest in developing rules for adjudication by such judges. See Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, ABA, Amendments to the Adjudicative
Provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (June 2, 2004) (Circulation
Draft) (approved by the Section in August of 2004) (Rep't, Prof. Michael Asimow),
available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/Prescriptive-recommendations-
6-02-04 revision.doc. The Section has proposed that, at its mid-year 2005 meeting,
the ABA recommend amending the APA to address "Type A" and "Type B" adjudica-
tion, with "Type B" referring to most of the adjudications in agencies undertaken by
non-ALJs. The effort is to make a uniform set of procedural norms apply, including a
prohibition on ex parte contacts by outsiders and rights to full disclosure of facts. See
Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, ABA, Federal Administrative
Adjudication in the 21st Century (Executive Summary of Oct. 12, 2004 and Recom-
mendations of Oct. 9, 2004) (on file with the author).
27 See Resnik, Morphing, Migrating, and Vanishing, supra note 23, at 800 chart II.
In contrast, in recent years, Article IIIjudges have presided over about 5000 civil trials
annually. See Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 23, at 461. That number is gener-
ous, in that the Administrative Office of the United States Courts defines "district
court trials as proceedings resulting in jury verdicts or other final judgments by the
courts, as well as other contested hearings at which evidence is presented." ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2003 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
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Whether in courts or in agencies, these adversarial proceedings
are governed by procedural rules that rely on a due process model;
disputants marshal facts and arguments and an impartial third party is
obliged to render judgment. The decisionmaker is limited to infor-
mation adduced on a record and is often required to provide explana-
tion for the judgment rendered. Thus, while each agency has its own
rules, with processes varying in terms of the procedural options and
the degree of formality, the system of rules is focused on obliging dis-
putants to provide information to each other and to decisionmakers,
both empowered and constrained as they render judgments that bind
parties. The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act, Goldberg v. Kelly,28
and the "due process revolution" of which that case is emblematic,
took much from the template for adjudication provided by the Fed-
eral Rules and applied it throughout the administrative-adjudicative
state.
That due process is at the center of this conception of Procedure
can be seen by a review of the 2004 volume Civil Procedure Stories,29 one
of a series of books aimed at giving in-depth analyses of the "great"
cases from various standard classes offered by law schools. Of the
fourteen chapters in Civil Procedure Stories, the question of procedural
due process is discussed specifically in three, analyzing the Supreme
Court decisions in Connecticut v. Doehr,30 in Goldberg v. Kelly,31 and in
COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 20 (2003), available at http://www.us
courts.gov/judbus2003/contents.html. On the other hand, it is not clear whether
that the term "district trials" and the resultant numbers include trials over which mag-
istrate judges preside, as the Administrative Office separately compiles that informa-
tion. Id. at 22-23 (noting that civil trials by consent before magistrates numbered
13,811, a nine percent increase over the prior year); see also Galanter, Vanishing Trial,
supra note 23, at 461, 474-76 (noting that magistrate judges conducted 959 civil trials
in 2002 and asking a series of questions about whether magistrate judge trials are
included as a part of the other federal trial numbers, as well as raising the difficulties
of analyzing the data given that magistrate disposition and trial data are not disaggre-
gated by the types of cases going to trial). Galanter also commented that the percent-
age of magistrate dispositions by trial has declined from a 1982 level of about one-
third to a 2002 level of 7.5 percent. Id. at 475.
28 397 U.S. 254 (1970). While the Court subsequently limited the reach of that
ruling, its conceptual frame remains central. SeeJudith Resnik, The Story of Goldberg:
Why This Case Is Our Shorthand [hereinafter Resnik, Why This Case Is Our Shorthand], in
CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE LEADING CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES
455 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) [hereinafter CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES].
29 The volume was edited by Professor Kevin M. Clermont and published in 2004
as part of a series by Foundation Press.
30 501 U.S. 1 (1991), discussed in Robert G. Bone, The Story of Connecticut v.
Doehr: Balancing Costs and Benefits in Defining Procedural Rights, in CIIL PROCEDURE
STORIES, supra note 28, at 153-92.
2005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.32 Due process is at the core of
the chapter discussing Shaffer v. Heitne3 3 and the power of courts to
compel appearances in their jurisdictions. Due process is also central
to the analyses of Conley v. Gibson34 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,35 both
addressed to whether the information presented to courts suffices to
grant motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Similarly, due
process is the framework for the inquiry about whether group-based
litigation is legitimate (in the chapter devoted to Hansbeny v. Lee)
3 6
and about whether one judgment can preclude subsequent decisions,
discussed in chapters devoted to Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore37 and to
Hilton v. Guyot.38 Further, the topic headings of the chapters-about
jurisdiction, governing law, parties, pleadings, motions, juries, and res
judicata-all highlight that Due Process Procedure is about the power
and legitimacy of judgments by state officials as they rule on disputes
brought by both public and private actors.
III. MOVING TowARDs CONTRACT
The volume of filings, the proliferation of adjudicatory processes,
and the many forms of rights garnered praise from some quarters but
also generated complaints. Whether Charles Clark's exuberant
description in 1963 of the "success of the federal" rules as "nothing
short of phenomenal" and without "criticism of major character" 39
31 397 U.S. 254 (1970), discussed in Resnik, Why This Case Is Our Shorthand, supra
note 28, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES, supra note 28, at 455-88.
32 452 U.S. 18 (1981), discussed in Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Story of Lassiter:
The Importance of Counsel in an Adversary System, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES, supra
note 28, at 480-528.
33 433 U.S. 186 (1977), discussed in Wendy Collins Perdue, The Story of Shaffer:
Allocating Jurisdictional Authority Among the States, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES, supra
note 28, at 129-52.
34 355 U.S. 41 (1957), discussed in Emily Sherwin, The Story ofConley: Precedent by
Accident, in CIvIL PROCEDURE STORIES, supra note 28, at 281-306.
35 477 U.S. 317 (1986), discussed in David L. Shapiro, The Story of Celotex: The
Role of Summary Judgment in the Administration of Civil Justice, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STO-
RIES, supra note 28, at 343-70.
36 311 U.S. 32 (1940), discussed in Jay Tidmarsh The Story ofHansberry: The Foun-
dation of Modern Class Actions, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES, supra note 28, at 217-80.
37 439 U.S. 322 (1979), discussed in Lewis A. Grossman, The Story ofParklane: The
"Litigation Crisis" and the Efficiency Imperative, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES, supra note
28, at 387-426.
38 159 U.S. 113 (1895), discussed in Louise Ellen Teitz, The Story of Hilton: From
Gloves to Globalization, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES, supra note 28, at 427-54.
39 Clark, supra note 14, at 254.
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was accurate at the time can be debated, 40 but such a claim could not
be made today. While the 1930s Federal Rules were once heralded as
model solutions to so many procedural challenges, they are now iden-
tified as sources of problems. Some bemoan adjudication's failures to
live up to its own promises, while others think that the rights-seeking
made available through adjudication is excessive. 41 The trans-substan-
tive framework of the Rules has been undermined from within, as spe-
cial rules have been promulgated for prisoners42 as well as for
complex cases.43 Further, Congress has imposed different procedural
requirements on certain kinds of litigants such as prisoners and the
purchasers of securities.
44
40 In 1963, Justices Black and Douglas filed a statement expressing their opposi-
tion to the submission to Congress of amendments to the Federal Rules. Thejustices
argued that because many of the rules "determine matters so substantially affecting
the rights of litigants in lawsuits that in practical effect they are the equivalent of new
legislation which ... the Constitution requires to be initiated in and enacted by the
Congress and approved by the President." Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr.
Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 865, 865-66 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
41 See generally ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
(2001). For analysis of how economic inequality diminishes the capacity of adver-
sarial systems to produce results viewed as legitimate, see Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494 (1986). My focus is on develop-
ments in the United States. Parallels exist in other legal systems as well as in transna-
tionaljustice. See, e.g., ASTOR & CHINKIN, supra note 5; Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR
Without Borders, LAW QUADRANGLE NoTEs, Fall/Winter 2003, at 77; JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002); MICHAEL ZANDER, THE
STATE OF JUSTICE (2000); Adrian S. Zuckerman, Lord Woolf's Access to Justice: Plus ca
Change.. . , 59 MODERN L. REv. 773 (1996); LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE LoRD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND
WALES (1996).
42 See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28
U.S.C. app. (2000) (effective Feb. 1, 1977, Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-426,
§ 1, 90 Stat. 1334, and as amended thereafter); Rules Governing Section 2255 Pro-
ceedings for the United States District Courts, id. (effective Feb. 1, 1977, Act of Sept.
28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-426, § 1, 90 Stat. 1334, and as amended thereafter).
43 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed. 2004); Rules of Procedure
of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 28 U.S.C. app. § 1407 (providing for
special procedures to handle cases consolidated across districts pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407).
44 See, e.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified in various parts of titles 18, 28, and 42,
including 18 U.S.C. §§ 3634, 3636, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997h of the United States
Code), discussed in Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1555
(2003); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in 1998 by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1, § 78a (2000)).
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As a variety of different kinds of concerns have converged, the
movement for ADR has succeeded in winning congressional attention
and in altering court processes and doctrine. Entities such as the
American Association of Law Schools (AALS) and the American Bar
Association (ABA) have developed sections devoted to dispute resolu-
tion as distinct from Civil Procedure, Complex Litigation, and Federal
Courts (in the context of the AALS) and from the Section on Litiga-
tion (in the context of the ABA).45 Through energetic promotion by
such proponents, ADR is making its way into legal practice and educa-
tion as it is inscribed into statutes, rules, and case law. Indeed, the
symposium in which this article sits is one marker of the success, for
ADR is now a course taught in enough law schools to prompt the
question about its relationship to the traditional first-year curricu-
lum. 4 6 Below, I detail some examples of the incorporation of ADR in
support of my argument that contemporary courses on Procedure
need to include analyses of processes not limited to Federal Rules of
45 The AALS's Section on ADR began in 1983. According to the 2003-2004
AALS Directory, some 540 people describe themselves as teachers of that subject. See
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 2003-2004, at
1184-88 (2003). The Section on Civil Procedure was begun in 1973 and has more
than 1200 persons listed as teaching it as a subject. Id. at 1193-1202. The Section on
Federal Courts, began in 1988, has about 650 people listed as teaching its subject
matter. Id. at 1313-18; see also E-mail from Tracie Thomas to Jennifer Peresie (Sept.
7, 2004) (providing information on the formal commencement dates of the three
AALS sections described) (on file with the author).
In the ABA, a Section on Dispute Resolution was begun more than a decade ago
and now has a membership of about 4000. It publishes a newsletter, entitled Just
Resolutions, as well as a magazine, called Dispute Resolution Magazine. See Richard Cher-
nick, From the Chair: The Dispute Resolution Section Comes of Age, DisPuTE RESOL. MAGA-
ZINE, Fall 2003, at 3.
46 Several casebooks and hornbooks provide materials. See, e.g., LAURAJ. COOPER,
DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, ADR IN THE WORKPLACE (2000); STEPHEN B.
GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER & NANCY H. ROGERS, DisPuTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIA-
TION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (3d ed. 1999); KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, KO-
VACH'S MEDIATION, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2000); CARRIE J. MENKEL-
MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL (forthcoming 2004); ALAN SCoTr
RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCoTr PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
ROLE OF LAWYERS (2002); LEONARD L. RISKIN &JAMES E. WESTBROOK, RISKIN AND WEST-
BROOK'S DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (abr. 2d ed. 1998); KATHERINE VAN WEZEL
STONE, ARBITRATION LAW (2003); KATHERINE VAN WEZEL STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE
LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2000); STEPHEN J. WARE, WARE'S HoRN-
BOOK ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2001). See generally Jean R. Stemlight,
Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 681 (2005).
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Civil Procedure and that the project of regulating Contract Procedure
needs to be addressed by judges, legislators, and commentators.
A. Legislative Promotion of ADR
ADR is a feature of agencies and court processes in part through
support from Congress, which has enacted statutes authorizing court-
annexed arbitration programs47 and has mandated or licensed the use
of ADR in agencies as well. 48 (One estimate is that some four hundred
federal employees work full time on ADR and that agency budgets
dedicate more than thirty-six million dollars annually to ADR
programs.)
49
Further, Congress has placed pro-settlement policies in other
bodies of law. For example, tax provisions permit defendants who
make payments into a settlement fund to deduct them at the time of
the fund's establishment rather than when (or if) funds are distrib-
uted to claimants.50 Other tax provisions accord favorable treatment
to those who buy and sell (factor) "structured settlements," which in-
volve a series of payments rather than a lump sum to an injured
party.51 Similarly, additions to the Bankruptcy Code have made feasi-
47 See, e.g., Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112
Stat. 2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000)).
48 See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 3(b) (1), 106
Stat. 944, 944 (1990) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584 (2000)); Adminis-
trative Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-354, § 3(b) (1),
106 Stat. 944, 944 (1992) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584 (2000)); see alsoJEFFREY M.
SENGER, FEDERAL DisPuTE RESOLUTION: USING ADR WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT 2 (2004) (describing the government's growing reliance on ADR and citing as
examples that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission uses mediation in
5000 workplace cases annually, that the U.S. Postal Service mediates about 10,000
claims, and that the Environmental Protection Agency employs eight full time staff
members who do ADR and "pays private mediators millions of dollars in mediator
fees each year").
49 SENGER, supra note 48, at 2. Senger is an ADR proponent, describing ADR as
consistent with "the values of the country." Id. at 16.
50 For the requirements of a "qualified settlement fund" or a "designated settle-
ment fund," see 26 U.S.C. § 468B (2000) (providing, for example, that payments must
be made to extinguish a tort liability). See generally Richard B. Risk, Jr., A Case for the
Urgent Need to Clarify Tax Treatment of a Qualified Settlement Fund Created for a Single
Claimant, 23 VA. TAx REv. 639 (2004).
51 See Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort Claims Has
Arrived, 2002 WIs. L. REv. 859, 876-81 (describing tax provisions, including 26 U.S.C.
§ 130(d), that create incentives for defendants to pay structured settlements that in-
volve the assignment to third parties to provide annuities to plaintiffs and arguing
that the current regime places the United States Treasury in the position of subsi-
dizing the defendants by its tax treatment of payments made by the companies to
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ble certain kinds of settlements that result in establishing schedules of
payments for present as well as future claims, 52 despite the due pro-
cess problems raised by efforts to resolve such issues through
adjudication.
53
B. Judicial Promotion of ADR
Ruledrafters, working in a process now dominated by federal
judges,54 have also reconfigured the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to direct judges to promote alternative dispute resolution. Below, I
explore three techniques: internalization, outsourcing, and
devolution.
1. Internalization: Changing the Federal Rules and the Judicial
Charter
The concept of settlement was not foreign in the 1930s to
ruledrafters, who knew well that many cases ended without adjudica-
which such structured settlements are assigned). Special tax treatment is also now
provided for factoring transactions if authorized by state law or made "primarily for
the benefit of a tort victim." See 26 C.F.R. pt. 157 (2004) (providing for implementa-
tion of 26 U.S.C. § 5891, the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-134, 115 Stat. 2427, 2436-39 (2002)).
How payments are characterized (as compensatory or punitive damages) also af-
fects tax treatment, and settlements permit parties (rather than adjudicators) to pro-
vide the initial description of damages in categories permitting tax exemptions. See
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (providing that non-punitive damage awards received on ac-
count of personal physical injuries or sickness are not part of income). The Internal
Revenue Service may make reassessments, but settlement documents can help to sup-
port allocations. See Risk, supra note 50, at 646-65. For example, a debate exists
about how to treat back pay awards made in Title VII cases. A Supreme Court ruling,
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992), interpreted 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2), the
pre-1991 provisions of that Act and concluded that back pay awards did not fall under
the nontaxable treatment as "damages received on account of personal injuries." A
few lower courts have since suggested that amendments to Title VII permit that form
of award to be exempt from taxation. Further, legislation has been proposed to re-
verse that decision. See Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2003, S. 557, H.R. 1155, 108th
Cong.
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 52 4 (g) (2000) (permitting prepackaged bankruptcies and a dis-
charge of a company's liability upon the creation of a trust approved by seventy-five
percent of the claimants, which results in current claimants' voting decisions affecting
future claimants in ongoing litigations such as asbestos, referenced expressly in
§ 524 (g) (2) (B)).
53 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1998); Samuel Issacharoff,
"Shocked": Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 1925, 1925-29 (2002).




tion. But their 1938 rules neither used the term "settlement" nor
charged judges with the task of promoting settlements. The drafters
did include a provision under one Federal Rule (68) for an "offer of
judgment"5 5 and, further, they prohibited class actions from being
"dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.
'5 6 In
contrast, the 2004 version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure uses
the word "settlement" in the texts of Rules 11,
57 16,58 23,'9 and 26.60
55 Rule 68 explained that if an adverse party failed to obtain a judgment more
favorable than had been offered, a court had the power to award costs from the time
the offer was made against a winning party. See FED. R. Crv. P. 68, 1938 Federal Rules,
supra note 3, 308 U.S. at 746. The 1987 revisions substituted language of "offeree" for
party but retained the model of the 1938 rules. The definition of "costs" varies de-
pending on whether statutes also provide for shifting either costs or attorneys' fees,
sometimes defined as an element of costs and other times not. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920
(2000); Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
56 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c), 1938 Federal Rules, supra note 3, 308 U.S. at 690.
57 The original Rule 11 was called "Signing of Pleadings." See 1938 Federal Rules,
supra note 3, 308 U.S. at 676. The current Rule 11, now called "Signing of Pleadings,
Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to Court; Sanctions," provides that mon-
etary "sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its
order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by
or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned." FED. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(2)(B). Further, the 1993 Advisory Committee Notes comment that Rule 11
motions should not be used to "exact an unjust settlement" and further explain that
parties "settling a case should not be subsequently faced with an unexpected order
from the court leading to monetary sanctions that might have affected their willing-
ness to settle or voluntarily dismiss a case."
58 See discussion infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
59 The 1938 version, "Class Actions," prohibited dismissal or compromise without
court approval. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c), 1938 Federal Rules, supra note 3, 308 U.S. at
690. The 2004 Rule has a subsection entitled "Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or
Compromise," and under that subsection, the process of settlement for class actions is
detailed to some extent, with more discussion in the Advisory Committee Notes. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
60 The word settlement was first used in the context of Rule 26 in the 1970 Advi-
sory Committee notes to amendments promulgated at that time. As the Advisory
Committee explained:
[D] isputes have inevitably arisen concerning the values claimed for discovery
and abuses alleged to exist.
The Committee... invited the Project for Effective Justice of Columbia Law
School to conduct a field survey of discovery. ...
The Columbia Survey concludes, in general, that there is no empirical
evidence to warrant a fundamental change in the philosophy of the discov-
ery rules. No widespread or profound failings are disclosed.... The costs of
discovery do not appear to be oppressive, as a general matter, either in rela-
tion to ability to pay or to the stakes of the litigation. Discovery frequently
provides evidence that would not otherwise be available to the parties and
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The addition of settlement to the set of activities assigned to
judges is a change of recent vintage, as can be seen from considering
the evolution of Rule 16. That Rule, initially denominated "Pre-Trial
Procedure; Formulating Issues," provided judges with discretion to
convene a "pre-trial" meeting with lawyers. 61 The listed purposes of
such a meeting included simplifying issues, amending pleadings, mak-
ing admissions, limiting expert witnesses, references to masters, and
such "other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. ' 62
For roughly forty-five years, from the promulgation of the Federal
Rules in 1938 to 1983, Rule 16 remained unchanged. But the prac-
tices of judges did change in that interval, as judges reconceived their
role and adopted a more managerial stance. 63 Some of that shift
came in response to what were then called "protracted cases" and are
today called "complex litigation." Desiring to gain "control" over the
many-party, many-issue case, judges developed special procedures to
do so. And then, the procedures crafted for the "big case" came to be
applied across a broader spectrum of the docket.64 Yet even as they
began in the 1960s and 1970s to structure the course of lawsuits in an
effort to control lawyers, judges debated whether it was appropriate
for them to raise the question of settlement during pretrial confer-
ences. Some jurists and lawyers argued that settlement was a "by-prod-
thereby makes for a fairer trial or settlement. On the other hand, no posi-
tive evidence is found that discovery promotes settlement.
Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 amendments to FED. R. Ctx. P. 26. In 1993,
Rule 26 was again amended to provide that the parties
must, as soon as practicable and in any event at least 21 days before a sched-
uling conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b),
confer to consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the
possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case ....
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) ("Conference of Parties: Planning for Discovery") (1993).
In 1970, Rule 26(b) (2) made plain that parties could obtain discovery of insur-
ance policies even though they were neither admissible nor likely to lead to admissi-
ble evidence. Rather, disclosure was appropriate to enable "counsel for both sides to
make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and litigation strategy
are based on knowledge and not speculation." See FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(b) (2) ("Insur-
ance Policies") and the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 amendments to FED. R.
Cirv. P. 26.
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 1938 Federal Rules, supra note 3, 308 U.S. at 684.
62 Id.
63 See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 11.
64 See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 19, at 938-43; Judith Resnik, Changing
Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Jus-
tice, and Civil Judging, 49 AI. L. REv. 133 (1997) (discussing how procedural
processes migrate from one kind of case to another).
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uct" of pretrial conferences but ought not itself be an objective stated
by judges convening those conferences.
65
The 1983 amendments represent the triumph of those judges
who sought to gain authority to press for settlement as well as to
streamline trials. The judicial charter to manage and to settle cases
became codified, as the discretionary possibility of a conference be-
came an obligatory requirement that judges enter scheduling orders
to frame the pretrial process.66 As the drafters noted, the purposes
were to make "case management an express goal of pretrial proce-
dure" and to move away from a pretrial "conference focused solely on
the trial and towards a process of judicial management that embraces
the entire pretrial phase, especially motions and discovery. '67 Fur-
ther, Rule 16 listed as one of its goals "facilitating the settlement of
the case." 68 Rule 16 authorized participants "at any conference under
this rule . . . [to] consider and take action with respect to . . . the
possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to re-
solve the dispute. '69 As the Advisory Committee's commentary put it,
that provision "explicitly recognizes that it has become commonplace
to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences." 70 Yet the Rule also
classified certain kinds of activities-"extrajudicial procedures to re-
solve the dispute"71 -as "adjudicatory techniques outside the
courthouse.
72
65 See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 19, at 947-49 (detailing the debates about
whether, because settlement could be a "by-product" of conferences, judges ought to
raise the topic).
66 SeeFED. R. Crv. P. 16(b) (1983); see also Resnik, ManagerialJudge, supra note 11,
at 399-402; Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv. 770 (1981).
67 See Advisory Committee Notes to subsection 16(a), FED. R. Cirv. P. 16 (1983).
68 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) (1983).
69 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (1983).
70 Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (1983).
71 FED. R. Cv. P. 16(c)(7) (1983).
72 As the Rule stated in the 1983 amendments, the purposes of a pretrial confer-
ence included consideration of "the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudi-
cial procedures to resolve the dispute." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (7) (1983). In 1993, the
word "extrajudicial" was deleted; the Advisory Committee explained that the new lan-
guage described
more accurately the various procedures that, in addition to traditional settle-
ment conferences, may be helpful in settling litigation. Even if a case cannot
immediately be settled, the judge and attorneys can explore possible use of
alternative procedures such as mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation,
neutral evaluation, and nonbinding arbitration that can lead to consensual
resolution of the dispute without a full trial on the merits....
See Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 amendments to FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c) (9).
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A decade later, those "extrajudicial procedures" officially moved
inside the courthouse. In 1993, Rule 16 was again amended to detail
more of the work and the power of the managerial judge, authorized
to direct "a party or its representative" to "be present or reasonably
available by telephone in order to consider possible settlement of the
dispute. ' 73 The 1993 amendments deleted the description of some
techniques as "extrajudicial" and called them instead "special proce-
dures."74 Added to the Rule's text was that the goal of such interven-
tion was to "assist in resolving the dispute, " 75 in contrast to the prior
statement that the aim was "to resolve the dispute."76 Thus judges
moved from resolution by adjudication to resolution by negotiation. As
the drafters explained:
Even if a case cannot be immediately settled, the judge and attor-
neys can explore possible use of alternative procedures such as
mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation, and
nonbinding arbitration that can lead to the consensual resolution
of the dispute without a full trial on the merits.
77
Furthermore, although the notes explaining the 1983 amend-
ment to Rule 16 had cautioned judges against imposing "settlement
negotiations on unwilling litigants," 78 the 1993 ruledrafters gave
judges power (whose parameters are unclear)79 to compel participa-
tion even when parties were reluctant to do so. As the Advisory Com-
73 FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(16) (1993).
74 FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(9).
75 Id. (emphasis added).
76 FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(7) (1983).
77 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 amendments to paragraph 16(c)(9),
FED. R. Civ. P.
78 Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(7) (1983).
79 See, e.g., In reAtlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding
that a district court may order "an unwilling party to participate in, and share the
costs of, non-binding mediation" either through local rules or statutory provisions or
under its "inherent powers as long as the case is an appropriate one and the order
contains adequate safeguards"); In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1407 (11th Cir. 1991)
(concluding that courts have inherent authority to "direct parties to produce individ-
uals with full settlement authority at pretrial settlement conferences"). The Novak
court also concluded that such power extended to named parties or nonparty insurers
in charge of a litigation but that a judge could not order an employee of a nonparty
insurer to participate. Id. The appellate court also reminded lower courtjudges that
they lack the power to compel parties to settle. Id. at 1405 (citing Kothe v. Smith, 771
F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985)); cf. In reAfrican-American Slave Descendants' Litigation, 272
F. Supp. 2d. 755, 758 (N.D. I11. 2003) (concluding that where a local rule provides
only for voluntary mediation and no federal statute compels mandatory mediation,
neither the Federal Rules nor a court's inherent powers should be used to require
mediation); see also discussion infra notes 166-204 and accompanying text.
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mittee noted, the rule "acknowledges the presence of statutes and
local rules or plans that may authorize use of some of these proce-
dures even when not agreed to by the parties."80
This approach has led to trial judges who energetically promote
settlement. Evidence of their activities comes from descriptions of
cases ranging from the many efforts to end the antitrust litigation
against Microsoft through a mediation with Richard Posner (a judge
on the Seventh Circuit but serving as a "mediator")"' to protests by
litigants in more ordinary lawsuits, as they object to judicial insistence
on the use of ADR.
82
Increasingly, judicial commentary describes going to trial as a
"failure of the system, ' 8 3 but such "failures" are no longer common-
See generallyJeffrey A. Parness & Lance C. Cagle, Guiding Civil Case Settlement Con-
ferences and Their Aftermath: The Need to Amend Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218, 35 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 779 (2004) (reviewing opinions on the enforceability of judicial insistence on
requiring settlement discussions and calling for written rules for participants in pre-
trial conferences); Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, Judicial Settlement Databases:
Developments and Uses, 43JUDGES' J., Winter 2004, at 19 (describing efforts to develop
databases to use as parameters for "fair" settlements). For discussion about the possi-
bility of coercive uses of settlement powers before the 1983 change, see Resnik, Mana-
gerial Judges, supra note 11, at 412-13.
80 See Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. Crv. P. 16(b)(9) (1993).
81 See Steve Lohr, U.S. vs. Microsoft: The Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2000, at
Cl; Richard Posner, Mediation: Address for the Frank E.A. Sander Lecture before the
American Bar Association, Section on Dispute Resolution (July 8, 2000) (June 12,
2000 manuscript on file with the author).
82 See, e.g., Pitman v. Brinker Int'l, Inc., No. CVO2-1886PHX-DGC, 2003 WL
23353478 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2003) (upholding in part the imposition of sanctions by a
magistrate judge on a defendant for failure to comply with a mandatory settlement
conference order requiring that parties authorized to settle be physically present and
prepared to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations); Nick v. Morgan's Foods,
Inc., 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court had the authority
under Rule 16 and a local rule to impose sanctions on a litigant who did not partici-
pate in good faith in a mandatory referral to a mediation).
83 Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 19, at 925. Of the various enthusiastic constit-
uencies for ADR, the support from judges is puzzling, as one might have thought that
judges could be counted among adjudication's loyalists. Yet judges have used both
their doctrinal authority and their dominant position as revisers of the 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to press towards disposition without adjudication, thereby
risking their own status by minimizing the reliance on their unique form of authority.
See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 805 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
Why have jurists become intent on promoting ADR? Three explanations, based
on differing analyses of events and of the desirability of adjudication, explain what I
have elsewhere described as competing trends of proliferation and privatization. See
Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing, supra note 23, at 785-89. A first presumes
that adjudication's utility attracted many claimants, resulting in overload. Judges saw
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place. Rather "a full trial on the merits" has become a rare event. In
the early 1940s, about fifteen percent of federal civil cases ended with
a trial.8 4 In 1962, about twelve percent the civil docket was resolved by
trial; today, trials are begun in about two percent of the civil docket.8 5
While dispositions have risen significantly over these years (from
50,000 dispositions in 1962 to more than 260,000 in 2002) ,86 even the
absolute number of civil trials has decreased, from about 5800 in 1982
too many cases, too long dockets, and too few decisionmakers, so judges used their
powers over process to try to accommodate more claimants. Under this analysis,
judges are attempting forms of triage, modifying adjudicatory services in an effort to
meet demand.
A second, again presuming adjudication's utility and specifically focused on its
power, understands the changing attitudes to be a form of backlash rather than ac-
commodation. As new kinds of claimants gained authority to make claims, new kinds
of defendants were put to the burden of explaining their actions. SeeJudith Resnik,
The Rights of Remedies: Collective Accountings for and Insuring Against the Harms of Sexual
Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 247 (Catharine A. MacKinnon
& Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); Anna-Maria Marshall, Injustice Frames, Legality, and the
Everyday Construction of Sexual Harassment, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 659 (2003); Theo-
dore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional
Litigation, 93 HARv. L. REV. 465 (1980).
The procedural and substantive reforms that redistributed the power to use adju-
dication produced many institutional actors-both public and private-who were un-
comfortable when labeled defendants and subjected to open examination. They did
not like court-imposed remedies such as prison reform, affirmative action, or tort
liability. Some of them had the ability to "play for the rules," to borrow Marc Ga-
lanter's now classic explanation of why the "'haves' come out ahead." See Marc Ga-
lanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw
& Soc'v REV. 95, 100 (1972) [hereinafter Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead].
Repeat players, with an advantage over "one-shot" participants, gained sufficient con-
trol in the federal government to install like-minded people as the judges who have
the authority to make the rules by which all are judged. See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, RIGHT
WING JUSTICE: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO TAKE OVER THE COURTS (2004); Dawn
E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential
Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003) (both describing how, be-
ginning in the 1980s, sequential Republican administrations relied on judicial ap-
pointments as a mechanism to change the law).
A third explanation is premised on adjudication's limitations, resulting in a fail-
ing faith in adjudicatory procedures. From a variety of vantage points, the processes
of courts seem too easily exploited, too labor intensive, and too unpredictable. Strate-
gic manipulation, uncontrollable lawyers, and questionable outcomes have prompted
judges, joined by many others, to rework liability and procedural rules to try to curb
abuses and mitigate structural weaknesses.
84 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 Wis. L. REv. 631, 633 [hereinafter Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences].
85 Galanter, Vanishing Tria4 supra note 23, at 460 tbl.1, 462 fig.1, 464.
86 Id. at 462 tbl.1.
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to about 4600 in 2002.87 That declining percentage exists across vari-
ous kinds of cases on the federal docket, with comparable falling rates
of trial on the criminal side.
Such data have prompted Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the
Fifth Circuit to title a lecture So Why Do We Still Call Them Trial
Judges?,88 and the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association
to enlist a group of academics to assess the import of "The Vanishing
Trial."89 The American Bar Association has also launched a project on
state court funding.90 The support of state courts generally accounts
for less than three percent of state budgets. 91 Almost two-thirds of
state courts have faced hiring freezes, and many have imposed new
fees, cut back programs, and sometimes suspended certain opera-
tions.92 Problems of staffing and support have also been identified
and sometimes denoted a "crisis" within the federal system. 93
Demands on courts and their budget shortfalls also help to ex-
plain the interest in alternative methods of and places for dispute res-
olution. And, in contrast to concerns about the "vanishing trial" and
more generally about funding for courts, the market in ADR appears
to be flourishing-with conferences (on topics such as "Court APR"),
services (through firms with names such as "EndDispute" or'AMS"-
87 Id. at 461.
88 See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture,
Loyola University: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, in 55 SMU L. REv. 1405,
1409-13 (2002).
89 See Galanter, Vanishing Tria4 supra note 23; see alsoJean R. Sternlight, The Rise
and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 17
(2003).
90 See BLACK LETTER RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON STATE
COURT FUNDING (2004) [hereinafter ABA 2004 STATE COURT FUNDING REPORT], and
State Court Funding Crisis: ABA Commission on State Court Funding, available at http://
www.abanet.org/jd/courtfunding/pdf/report-with-rec.pdf. Upon the recommenda-
tion of the Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, the ABA House of Dele-
gates adopted the report and recommendations of the ABA Commission on State
Court Funding as they were submitted. See Memorandum on the 2004 Annual Meet-
ing from the Select Committee of the House, to Members of the House of Delegates 8
(Aug. 23, 2004).
91 ABA 2004 STATE COURT FUNDING REPORT, supra note 90, at 4.
92 Id. at 5.
93 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, This Time, Wolves at Justice's Door: Where Budget Woes in
Federal Courts Are Not New, Latest Crunch Is Severe, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 1, 2004, at S1 (detail-
ing concerns about the inability to maintain services and discussion how, about four
years ago, the federal judiciary went from a ten percent annual increase in its budget
to increases of under five percent per annum, despite growing caseloads); FY 2004
Appropriations Finally Ok'd; But Courts Still Face Fiscal Threat, 35 THIRD BRANCH 1 (Feb.
2004) (describing an increase for the budget of federal courts as 4.7 percent, ex-
plained as 2.3 percent under what was needed to maintain services).
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Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc.), law school classes,9 4
model rules,95 and an ever-expanding literature addressing the pro-
gress and challenges.
96
Fewer trials and more conciliation results in less appellate over-
sight of trial-level judges, which is (as Stephen Yeazell has put it) one
of the "misunderstood consequences" of the 1930s reforms.97 The va-
rious changes in statutes, doctrine, and court-based rules, coupled
with educational programs for judges, have helped to redefine the
"good judge" as a person focused on and able to achieve dispositions
quickly. As one judge lectured his colleagues, "in most cases, the abso-
lute result of a trial is not as high a quality of justice as is the freely
negotiated, give a little, take a little settlement."98 What is judicial
(and judicious) is no longer equated with adjudication, with public
processes, and with reasoned deliberation.
Further, settlement pressures are not confined to the trial courts.
Appellate courts have also changed their processes to aim for disposi-
tion through conciliation. Federal rules now permit appellate courts
to "direct the attorneys-and, when appropriate, the parties-to par-
ticipate in one or more conferences to address any matter that may
aid in disposing of the proceedings, including simplifying the issues
94 See supra note 46 (listing several of the casebooks and hornbooks now availa-
ble); supra note 45 (detailing the number of teachers listed as providing such classes).
95 See, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION AcT, 7A pt. II U.L.A. (Supp. 94 2004) (approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and recom-
mended for enactment in all the states in 2001). Two states (Illinois and Nebraska)
have enacted such statutes, effective in January 2004. Id. In 2003, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved an amendment to the
Uniform Mediation Act to add a section to include "international commercial concili-
ation" and "international commercial mediation" within the purview of the act. See
AMENDMENT TO THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT TO ADD AN ARTICLE REGARDING INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL MEDIATION (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bl I/
ulc/mediaticca/2003act.pdf.
96 Many volumes are aimed at practitioners. See, e.g., How ARBITRATION WORKs
(Alan Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003) (citing on its cover page the Committee on ADR
in Labor & Employment Law of the ABA); How ADR WoRKs (Norman Brand ed.,
2002) (citing the Committee on ADR in Labor & Employment of the ABA as its spon-
soring organization). See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound:
Have We Found a Better Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 93 (2002).
97 Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 84, at 646-48.
98 Hubert L. Will, Judicial Responsibility for the Disposition of Litigation, Proceedings of
the Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District Judges, 75 F.R.D. 203, 203 (1976).
This comment from Judge Will was made in conjunction with a discussion in which
Judges Robert R. Merhige and Alvin B. Rubin also spoke. See generallyJudith Resnik,
Mediating Preferences: Litigants' Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for Settlement,
2002J. DIsP. REsOL. 155.
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and discussing settlement."99 More than half of the federal circuits
run such a "civil appeals management program" (CAMP) and oblige
attorneys for disputants to meet with staff members of the appellate
court to negotiate settlements. 10 0
2. Outsourcing: The Changing Doctrine on Contractual ADR
In addition to the internalization of ADR, judges have another
means of promoting ADR-enforcing contracts that divest courts of
jurisdiction. Organized alternatives to courts predate contemporary
developments; various trade groups as well as some religious and eth-
nic communities have long provided their own stylized dispute resolu-
tion processes for conflicts arising within these self-contained
communities. a0 1 But the law had been ambivalent about enforcing
99 See FED. R. APP. P. 33. The rule is described as "entirely rewritten" in the early
1990s by the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1994 amendment.
100 See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. APP. P. 33(b) (1), app. (2004) (discussing a pre-argument
conference "to consider the possibility of settlement" with a person designated by the
court as a "Settlement Counsel"); 2D Cm. R. APP. P. app., Guidelines for Conduct of
Pre-Argument Conferences under the Civil Appeals Management Plan (2004)
(describing the importance of an objective evaluation by Staff Counsel that considers
"the possibility of settlement" as well as the simplification of issues, and that in many
instances the result is "settlement or withdrawal of some appeals or particular issues");
5xTH CIR. R. APP. P. 33, Internal Operating Procedures: Appeal Conferences (1996)
(describing referral of cases to an "appellate conference attorney" for a meeting at
which settlement is one of the topics to be addressed); 6TH CIR. R. APP. P. 33(c) (1),
Appeal Conferences-Mediation (2004) (requiring that all civil cases be reviewed by a
"mediation attorney" to decide whether a pre-argument conference would be useful
and permitting either a circuit judge or a staff attorney to serve as a "mediation attor-
ney" to discuss settlement, and noting that if ajudge serves, thatjudge may not sit on
a panel but could participate in an en banc rehearing); 8TH CIR. R. APP. P. 33(a) (b)
(2004) (providing that civil appeals may be sent to a prehearing conference program
to enable discussions of a variety of matters, including settlement and authorizing
either the program director or a senior district judge to conduct such conferences);
9
TH CIR. R. APP. P. 33-1, Settlement Program (2004) (providing that the "primary
purpose" of such conferences is "to explore settlement," noting that either "the judge
or court mediator" may require parties to attend, and that parties can also submit
issues "to an appellate commissioner for a binding determination"); FED. CIR. R. App.
P. 33 (2004) (Appeal Conferences) (permitting the court to direct "attorneys-and
when appropriate the parties-to participate in one or more conferences to address
any matter . . .including . . . settlement" that aids in the disposition, permitting a
judge or other person "designated by the court" to preside, and the court to issue
orders thereafter "controlling the course of the proceedings or implementing any
settlement agreement").
101 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Rela-
tions in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 132-33 (1992); see also ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
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obligations to participate in private dispute resolution at the expense
of access to public processes. Judges guarded their own monopoly
power and regularly refused to enforce arbitration contracts.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the attitudes of legisla-
tors and court-based adjudicators changed. In 1925, Congress en-
acted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), recognizing arbitration
contracts as enforceable obligations.10 2 Yet judges sometimes de-
clined enforcement if such agreements contained waivers of federal
litigation rights and were made before actual conflicts arose. Jurists
found arbitration too flexible, too lawless, and too informal when con-
trasted with adjudication, esteemed for its regulatory role in monitor-
ing adherence to national norms.
10 3
However, in the 1980s, the United States Supreme Court revised
its earlier rulings and upheld broad grants of authority to arbitrators,
even when federal statutory rights to bring lawsuits were claimed.
10 4
Instead of objecting to the informality of arbitration, judges praised its
flexibility. Butjudges did not simply alter their attitudes towards arbi-
tration; they also changed their views of adjudication, which came to
be described as only one of several techniques appropriate for the
resolution of disputes.105 Today, law often sends contracting parties
(including employees and consumers) to mandatory arbitration pro-
grams created by employers, manufacturers, and the providers of
goods and services.10 6 Many of the disputants pressed into these ac-
102 See Pub. L. No. 68401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(2000)). As first enacted, it was called the "U.S. Arbitration Act," but it is now com-
monly referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act. Professors Michael Leroy and Peter
Feuille argue that the claim of judicial hostility to arbitration is overstated. See
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agree-
ments: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 249 (2003).
103 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). See generallyJudith Resnik, Many
Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 211 (1995) [hereinafter Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors?].
104 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (both upholding ex ante
arbitration agreements as sufficient despite claims of violation of federal securities
and antitrust rights). Thereafter, the Court enforced arbitration clauses despite alle-
gations of discrimination under federal or state law. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001).
105 Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors?, supra note 103, at 253-54; see also Paul D.
Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the "National Policy" of the Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259
(2002).
106 See, e.g., Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105; Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S.
79 (2000); see also Demaine & Hensler, supra note 10. As noted supra note 12, when
litigants challenge the obligation to arbitrate, courts inquire into the adequacy of
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commodating negotiations are strangers to each other rather than
participants in long-term commercial relationships or in communities
of affiliation.'
0 7
3. Devolution to Agencies
Yet a third way in which Congress and courts have joined to-
gether to promote ADR is through the devolution of adjudicatory and
conciliatory work from courts to public institutions such as agencies.
Since the nineteenth century, executive officials have had the power
to provide benefits (such as veterans' pensions),108 but only during
the twentieth century did these legislative grants gain the status of en-
titlements to which process rights became attached under Supreme
Court elaboration of due process doctrine. In the early days of
agency-based factfinding, enforcement powers rested primarily in the
courts, which also retained authority to review factfinding. 10 9
Over the decades, Congress gave more autonomy to agency adju-
dicators. While the Supreme Court once hesitated to uphold the del-
egation of too many attributes of federal judicial power to non-life-
arbitral tribunals and sometimes find the process insufficient or the form of con-
tracting unconscionable. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability,
and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration
Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757 (2004). Additional concerns can be
found in commentary by Paul D. Carrington and Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Juris-
diction, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 331; Richard C. Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration: Democracy
and Dispute Resolution, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004); and Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury
Claims, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (2004).
Further, in a rider to an appropriations bill in 2002, Congress created an excep-
tion to enforcement of predispute clauses for arbitration for automobile franchisers.
See Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-273, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226). A recent com-
ment on this provision argued that it was both the first to create an exemption from
the FAA and benefitted "relatively sophisticated business interests rather than individ-
ual consumers or employees who have also sought exemptions." See CarlJ. Chiappa &
David Stoelting, Tip of the Iceberg? New Law Exempts Car Deals from Federal Arbitration Act,
22 FRANCHISE LJ. 219, 219 (2003). The effects of this act have been the subject of
some litigation addressing what contracts are affected by it. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler
Vans LLC v. Freightliner of N.H., Inc., Civil No. 03-304-B, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 316
(D.N.H. Jan. 8, 2004) ("not for publication"); Pride v. Ford Motor Co., 341 F. Supp.
2d 617 (N.D. Miss. 2004).
107 Cf Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAw AND
HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982).
108 See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITI-
CAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).
109 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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tenured federal factfinders,I 10 in recent years the Court has embraced
several congressional grants of jurisdiction to such judges and ex-
plained just how 'judge-like" agency decisionmakers are.I"' Non-life-
tenured federal adjudicators are now understood to be competent to
rule on a range of issues with ever greater finality 1 2 and to develop
their own systems of appellate review. 113 In short, a second set of "fed-
eral courts" has developed inside federal agencies that also promul-
gate rules of procedure and, as noted, often promote negotiated
outcomes.
114
C. A New Civil Procedure
The insistence on the use of conciliation, whether inside courts
or provided through processes based elsewhere, represents the emer-
gence of a new mode of civil processing. 15 Aspects of privately-based
110 See id. at 51, 62 (expressing concern about the delegation of "essential attrib-
utes of the judicial power" and refusing to accord finality to determinations by hear-
ing officers of "jurisdictional facts").
111 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (conclud-
ing that because that adjudicatory commission is so court-like, states enjoy immunity
from privately-commenced proceedings within it). See generally Deborah A. Geier, The
Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee: A
Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985 (1991).
112 See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); see also Resnik,
Inventing the Federal District Courts, supra note 24, at 625-43 (detailing the shift in un-
derstanding and the doctrinal evolution about when life-tenured judges were
required).
113 Within the federal courts, each circuit has the power to create "bankruptcy
appellate panels" (BAPs) comprised of bankruptcy judges (who serve for fourteen-
year, renewable terms). See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2000). Rulings from BAPs can be
appealed to the circuit courts but do not go, as may judgments of individual bank-
ruptcy judges, to district courts. Within agencies, appellate structures vary. The re-
cently created Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has developed a singlejudge
appellate process in addition to using threejudge panels. See Sarah M. Haley, Single-
Judge Adjudication in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Devaluation of Stare
Decisis, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 535 (2004) (comparing that practice and the issuance by
federal appellate courts of decisions that cannot be cited as precedent). For chal-
lenges to the process of state administrative procedures, see Barcia v. Sitkin, 367 F.3d
87 (2d Cir. 2004) (reviewing a request to modify a consent decree involving the prac-
tices of the New York State Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, challenged for
process failures under the Social Security Act and the Due Process Clause).
114 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
115 This phenomenon has attracted a good deal of attention within the academy.
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, From Judgment to Settlement: The Changing Character of American
Courts (University Lecture, Boston University, 2000); Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note
19; Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle".-Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
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dispute resolution are now melded with public processes as the state
itself embraces private dispute resolution for a wide array of conflicts
brought to its courts and puts judges in the job of trying to resolve
disputes through contracts. In many respects, the turning to and in-
corporating of ADR into federal adjudication represents the privatiza-
tion of public processes-a development that is not unique to
courts. 11 6 Just as the expansion of the Due Process Model of Civil
Procedure rested on a normative framework welcoming of national
regulation and rights-seeking, so the shift to contract is nested inside
social and political attitudes less hospitable to government oversight.
The Contract Model of Procedure rests on analytic premises dif-
ferent from that of the Due Process Model. Adjudication is predi-
cated on public and disciplined factfinding by judges and juries,
licensed to inquire into specific problems to assess individual in-
stances of alleged wrongdoing in order to enforce obligations.
117
Both judges and litigants are confined to particular roles. As Lon
Fuller famously explained, the presentation of proofs by litigants and
the determination based on reasons by judges are the "distinguishing"
characteristics of adjudication, which puts individuals working inside
its strictures to "a peculiar form of participation."' 18
Support for such a process rests on a series of normative and po-
litical judgments: that the state is the appropriate central regulator of
conduct, that norm enforcement through transparent decisionmak-
ing by state-empowered judges is desirable, that public resources
ought to be spent upon individual complaints of alleged failures to
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994). The ABA project on the Vanishing Trial, see
notes 23 and 89 supra, is an effort to bring the issues into focus more broadly.
116 Proponents praise such evolutions as forms of "governance" that meld public
or private. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization,
116 HI- v. L. REv. 1285 (2003). Opponents see this development as a form of coloni-
zation, although who is the colonizer and who the colonized is less clear. Some ADR
loyalists worry about law undermining ADR's values, and some adjudication loyalists
worry that private authority is appropriating public power. Illustrative is the debate
about the promulgation in 2001 of a Uniform Mediation Act, see supra note 95, and
about revision of the 1994 Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (put forth by
the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association's Section on Dis-
pute Resolution, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and re-
printed in How ADR WORKS, supra note 96, at 983-90). As one commentator
explained his objections, the movement towards certification and standards under-
mines the "concept of party self determination" which, in his view, is at the core of
mediation. See Harry N. Mazadoorian, Conflicting Goals in National Developments,
CONN. L. TRIB., July 5, 2004, at 2.
117 See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 19, at 1024-31; Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of
Justice, 93 HA \,. L. Rxv. 1, 5-17 (1979).
118 Fuller, supra note 7, at 364.
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comply with legal obligations, that litigants ought to be provided with
opportunities to present proofs and reasoned arguments, that the
power of adjudicators can be controlled by obliging them to rely on
facts adduced on the record and to perform some of their duties in
public, and that legitimate judgments thus result.11 9 While ad hoc ju-
ries have little by way of obligations of explanation, full-time judges
are supposed to provide rationales for their application of law to fact,
and those decisions are in turn subjected to appellate review at the
parties' behest. Direct participants and third parties benefit through
the visible display of law's requirements applied to a myriad of specific
situations.
Processes denoted as ADR or DR rest on other assumptions. Un-
like adjudication's preference for adjudicators' pronouncements,
ADR looks to the participants to validate outcomes through consen-
sual agreements, sometimes fashioned by bilateral negotiation and
sometimes facilitated through third parties.1 20 But ADR has far fewer
role constraints and does not commonly build in requirements of
public explanation of the results obtained nor insist that such out-
comes be justified in relationship to legal norms. ADR practitioners
are free to "get it done" rather than obliged to explain how they "got
it right." Indeed, ADR is often chosen because it has the advantage of
private decisionmaking, made in the "shadow" rather than in the
light. Public benefits are presumed to flow from the reduction of con-
flict and the resolutions predicated on parties' preferences.
Before turning to the problems of the law of Contract Procedure,
let me be clear that while I believe Due Process Procedure to be in
eclipse, it is surely not dead. As was evident from several decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in the 2004 term, those justices (as
well as lower court jurists) remain committed to procedural due pro-
cess. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and other 9/11 cases are exemplary in that
most members of the Court insisted that the President lacked the uni-
lateral power to confine individuals without affording them some kind
of process.1 2' A majority refused to permit complete reliance on what
119 Several Supreme Court decisions address aspects of these premises. The pub-
lic character of adjudicatory processes has been described in cases such as Press-Enter-
prise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
120 See Amy Schulman, Sidebar, Change of Venue, in THE FUTURE LITIGATION: SPE-
CIAL REPORT, A SUPPLEMENT TO THE AMERICAN LAWYER AND CORPORATE COUNSEL 26
(2003).
121 See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004) (concluding that federal courts
had jurisdiction, pursuant to their statutory jurisdiction involving habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., to consider challenges brought to the legality of detention of
"foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at
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could be characterized as a kind of ADR-the in-house programs of-
fered by the Executive to detainees under the Executive Order estab-
lishing military commissions; rather, the majority insisted on some
independence for the decisionmakers and some structure by which
they were to make decisions.' 2 2 Moreover, in Tennessee v. Lane, a ma-
jority held that access to courts was such a fundamental right that,
whatever the scope of state sovereign immunity under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, lawsuits against states were possible if states failed
to enable the handicapped to enter their courthouses.
123
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba"); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635
(2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that "due process demands that a citizen held in
the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to con-
test the factual basis of that detention before a neutral decisionmaker"). Justice Sou-
ter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in part and dissented in part, whereas
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, concluded that rather than vacating the lower
court's judgment, it ought to be reversed because absent a congressional suspension
of habeas corpus, Mr. Hamdi had rights of access to the federal courts. Id. at
2660-61; see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (concluding that the
habeas petition, filed by a United States citizen detained in South Carolina, could not
be heard by a federal trial court in New York, where the petitioner once was).
122 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635 (describing the obligation to provide a neutral
decisionmaker). The plurality insisted on impartiality but did not rule out the possi-
bility that "an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal"
could apply the minimal standards of process that it articulated, including individual-
ized hearings for factfinding, an initial burden on the government to produce evi-
dence of its decision to detain, with a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
government's evidence such that a petitioner could provide "more persuasive evi-
dence" that he or she fell "outside the criteria" for detention. Id. at 2649-51. In the
proceedings now ongoing, process demands have been reiterated. According to news
reports, the result is "the possibility that the proceedings specifically established to
provide a more efficient alternative to the nation's civilian criminal courts could be-
come as problem-ridden as" proceedings against terrorists in the federal district
courts. See Neil A. Lewis, Terror Tribunal Defendant Demands to Be Own Lawryer, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A14. Further, many critics complain that the procedures
accorded violate both United States and international law. See, e.g., Neal K_ Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE
L.J. 1259, 1260-66 (2002).
123 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1988-92 (2004). George Lane, a paraplegic reliant on a wheel-
chair for his mobility, averred that he had to crawl up steps to a second floor court-
room in order to respond to criminal charges in a courthouse in Tennessee. Joined
by others, Lane argued that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
which forbids discrimination against the disabled in public services, programs, and
activities, required that Tennessee make reasonable accommodations to enable ac-
cess. These plaintiffs also sought monetary relief for their injuries. Id. at 1982-83.
Tennessee, joined by a few other states, countered that Congress could not constitu-
tionally apply the ADA's obligations to states because they enjoyed immunity, as sover-
eigns, from such private enforcement actions. Id. at 1982-85. An earlier ruling,
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), had held
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Above, I invoked the just-published book Civil Procedure Stories to
illustrate how much the Due Process Model permeated the "great"
procedural judgments of the twentieth century. I assume that, when
the next version of that book comes into being, due process cases
(perhaps such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld) will be chosen for chapter-length
analyses. But they will, in my view, be joined by rulings such as Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,124 Martin v. Wilks, 1 25 Amchem Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Windsor,126 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,127 and Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams.128 Several of these opinions are not about whether
court-based processes are accessible and fair. Rather, these decisions
are about the jurisdiction of courts to settle cases, the scope of the
issues settled, the power to bargain, the obligations of judges to over-
see bargaining, and the enforceability of contracts to divest courts of
jurisdiction. In short, Civil Procedure Stories need now to incorporate a
new plot line-of contract.
IV. CONTRACT PROCEDURE
My purpose in this section is to outline some of the analytic ques-
tions with which Contract Procedure has to deal. Proceduralists have
become aware of the complexity of achieving or appraising the fair-
ness of settlements in the context of class actions, where the chal-
lenges of representative litigation make vivid the difficulties of
monitoring those charged with providing consent on behalf of absen-
tees. 129 As I detail below, comparable problems exist in smaller-scale
that Title I of the ADA, involving non-discrimination in employment, could not con-
stitutionally be applied by private parties seeking monetary damages from the states.
Further, under current Supreme Court doctrine, Congress may use its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement powers to authorize private actions, but only if the legisla-
tion is an "appropriate remedy for identified constitutional violations" and exhibits
"congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997); see also Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1998; Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 728 (2003). In the 2004 decision, the five-person majority did not announce a
broad rule about Title II's applicability to the states but instead relied on the special
stature of rights of access to courts, protected by the Due Process Clause, to conclude
that Congress had the power to authorize Mr. Lane's lawsuit against Tennessee. Lane,
124 S. Ct. at 1994.
124 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
125 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
126 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
127 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
128 523 U.S. 105 (2001).
129 The strategic behavior of attorneys for plaintiffs, coupled with defendants in
search of "global peace" and judges eager to dispose of problems, has sometimes
yielded settlements criticized for sacrificing the interests of the injured and the pub-
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litigation, filled with conflicts over attorneys' authority to negotiate
deals and about the content of agreements reached under the aegis of
judges eager to obtain dispositions.
From the technical questions (how does one enter a settlement
agreement) to the constitutional (are settlement contracts "cases"
over which federal courts have jurisdiction) to the conceptual (ought
a law of contracts about agreements made under the auspices of
courts differ from contract principles in general), issues abound. As
some of the resultant disputes illustrate, the shift to contract has yet to
be accompanied by clear rules to guide lawyers or judges or by explo-
ration of the normative implications of the nascent doctrines. The
problems to be addressed include judicial oversight of alternative
processes that now are located in court-based programs,1 30 in contrac-
tual ADR, 131 and in agencies. 132 My focus below is on one aspect-the
shape of lawmaking about settlements sparked by court-based
bargaining.
A. Contracting for Jurisdiction
One issue, familiar to proceduralists, is the power of courts to
enter and then to enforce settlements. What a series of cases reveals is
that through settlement, litigants can obtain jurisdiction in either
state or federal court that would not or might not exist were litigation
the only alternative. I describe this phenomenon as "contracting for
jurisdiction." Choice of venue clauses, permitting parties to specify in
lic. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); Judith Resnik, Liti-
gating and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. DAviS L. REv.
835 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 805
(1997); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv.
1051 (1996). See generally DEBORAH R. HENSLER, NICHOLAS M. PACE, BONITA DOMBEY-
MOORE, BETH GIDDENS, JENNIFER GROSS & ERIK K. MOLLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:
PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000).
130 See, e.g., In reAtlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing
what a mandatory mediation order should entail and the need for local rulemaking
on ADR programs); Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services
by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 715 (1999).
131 See, e.g., Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1055 (8th Cir. 2004) (conclud-
ing that a district court had to learn more about the costs of arbitration to determine
whether the agreement to do so was unconscionable); Campbell v. General Dynamics
Gov't Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 143 (D. Mass. 2004) (addressing the quality of
notice of a mandatory arbitration agreement and finding e-mail notification insuffi-
cient to permit the extinction of a right to a jury trial).
132 See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (reviewing the
"streamlined" regulations issued by Attorney General Ashcroft for permitting affirm-
ance without opinions of rulings by Immigration Judges).
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contracts where a dispute will be heard, are one such example that
has been approved by the courts. 133
Another example, resulting in expanding the jurisdiction of state
courts, is Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein. 134 There, the ques-
tion was whether the Delaware Chancery Court, with jurisdiction over
a state securities case, had the power through a settlement to bar fur-
ther litigation of shareholders' federal securities claims arising out of
the same transactions but raised in cases filed in the federal courts in
California. In a ruling that surprised many,' 3 5 the Supreme Court
held that although the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over
the federal claims, a Delaware judgment was entitled to full faith and
credit and could therefore preclude subsequent litigation-so long as
the representation was adequate.13 6 In other words, although Dela-
ware did not have jurisdiction to try such cases, it had (through the
"alchemy of settlement")137 the authority to dispose of them.
In Matsushita, settlement became the means to create statejuris-
diction more far-reaching than would otherwise be available. In its
wake, the problem of "nationwide" state class actions has grown, as
have debates about the power of federal judges to use the All Writs
Act and the Anti-Injunction Act to stop competing class actions. 138 In
addition to generating state court powers, settlements can also be a
vehicle for the creation of ancillary federaljurisdiction. Further, even
given the strictures of the Eleventh Amendment, federal jurisdiction
133 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590-95 (1991).
134 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
135 See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State
Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 219.
136 On remand, the Ninth Circuit initially held that the representional structure
was inadequate. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1997). Com-
mentary on that decision can be found in a series of articles published in New York
University's Law Review, including William T. Allen, Finality of Judgments in Class Ac-
tions: A Comment on Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149 (1998). However,
after a rehearing with one judge substituted for Judge William Norris, who had by
then resigned from the federal bench, a new majority found that the absent class
members had been adequately represented. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641,
642-44 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1004 (1999). See generally Henry Paul
Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members,
98 COLUM. L. RE,. 1148 (1998).
137 This phrase comes from a section of the casebook, ADJUDICATION AND ITS AL-
TERNATVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 699-754 (2003), that Owen Fiss and I
co-authored.
138 See, e.g., Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002)
(holding that the All Writs Act did not provide federal courts with the authority to
remove state cases unless federal jurisdiction existed independently over the original
subject matter of the lawsuit).
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can through consent decrees impose obligations on state officials that
could not flow from adjudicated orders.1 39 (In 1996, Congress cre-
ated an exception sharply limiting federal courts' continuing jurisdic-
tion over consent decrees in prison reform litigation.)1
40
Moreover, federal district courts can also-through settlement-
gain decisional authority over multidistrict cases that they currently
have no statutory power to try.' 4 1 And a debate exists about whether
contracts to arbitrate can give judges more power over arbitrators' de-
cisions than is provided by statutes insulating arbitration outcomes
from court review. 142 Thus, if lawyers are careful when they write set-
139 See Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899, 901-03 (2004) (holding that a 1996 con-
sent decree signed by state officials and obliging them to implement Medicaid provi-
sions on behalf of children in Texas eligible for Early and Periodic Screening,
Diagnosis, and Treatment programs under federal law was enforceable despite state
officials' claims that to do so undermined state sovereign interests).
140 See Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.
1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified as amended at various sections of titles 18, 28,
and 42 U.S.C). An aspect of its constitutionality was addressed in Miller v. French, 530
U.S. 327, 350 (2000) (upholding the provision requiring an automatic stay against a
challenge that Congress had unconstitutionally intruded on the courts' domain).
141 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)
(interpreting the Multidistrict Litigation Act's provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) for the
transfer of civil cases for pretrial proceedings and their remand thereafter to preclude
retention of such cases for trial). In contrast, if the case settles during the period of
multidistrict litigation (MDL) supervision, no remand is required. Legislation has
been proposed to reverse this decision by authorizing the judge assigned to a case
through the MDL process to retain jurisdiction for trial, but, as of this writing, this
aspect of bills relating to multi-party jurisdiction has not yet been enacted. See Mul-
tidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. (2004).
142 Some of the circuits have stressed that contracts for arbitration should not be
used as a pathway to more litigation through parties' contracts authorizing courts to
review awards. Other courts have taken the view that the federal policy for arbitration
means that contracts can be shaped to reflect parties' preferences, including an
agreement to expand the authority of courts to review awards. Compare Schoch v.
InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2003) (describing that circuit's law as pro-
viding that if parties can impose a heightened review standard on arbitrator's find-
ings, they must do so "clearly and unmistakably"), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1414 (2004),
and Rivera v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259-60 (D. Md. 2004) (noting that judi-
cial review of awards is "severely circumscribed" and describing the circumstances
under the Federal Arbitration Act and case law when courts may vacate an arbitrator's
award), with Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir.
1995) (interpreting the FAA as not precluding parties' decisions to expand federal
court review). More recently, the Fifth Circuit described its rule as permitting parties
to "modify the FAA's standard of arbitration review." See Action Industries, Inc. v.
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 358 F.3d 337, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding that
in the absence of "clear and unambiguous" contractual language, FAA rules apply).
See generally Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Revolving Door ofJustice: Arbitration
Agreements That Expand Court Review, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 861 (2004); Ste-
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dement documents and when they craft dispute resolution programs,
they can succeed in conferring authority on state and federal judges.
But, as the case law illustrates, confusion exists about how to craft
contracts to settle lawsuits. The word "settlement" now appears in the
Federal Rules but no federal rule currently has as its title either the
word "settlement" or the terms "consent decrees" or "consent judg-
ments," nor do rules detail how to craft the relevant documents.
Rather, the parties are left to figure out-by looking at rules about
dismissal and about judgments143 and by relying on local customs-
how to end a case with an enforceable agreement.1 44 Not all succeed.
1. Consenting to a "Decree" or a 'Judgment"
Start with the linguistical and normative puzzle of whether con-
sent decrees, consent judgments, consent orders, and settlements are
or ought to be all the same. The term "decree" comes from equity
practice whereas the term 'judgment" comes from law. Whether his-
torically decrees and judgments were themselves different was a ques-
tion discussed by treatise writers. But even if different, the
"distinction between decrees and judgments [had] not always been
strictly preserved in American practice."'145 When the 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure created a single "form of action" and thereby
combined the practices of law and equity, drafters picked the word
phen J. Ware, "Opt-In "for Judicial Review of Errors of Law under the Revised Uniform Arbi-
tration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 263 (1997). Yet another question is the ability to
contract out of law altogether. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National
Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523 (2005).
143 See FED. R. CIv. P. 41 (Dismissal of Actions); FED. R. Civ. P. 54 (Judgments;
Costs); FED. R. Crv. P. 58 (Entry of Judgment).
144 For suggestions as to how to write new rules and examples of rules from states
about settlement contracts, see Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Enforcing Set-
tlements in Federal Civil Actions, 36 IND. L. REv. 33 (2003).
145 1 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 4-5 (1891)
(also noting that, in states where "all distinction between law and equity, as far as it
relates to pleading and practice, is abolished, ... the difference between judgments
and decrees is also swept away"); see also ROBERT MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 356 (1952). Black also drew a distinction
between judgments and decrees (on the one hand) and orders-defined as "the man-
date or determination of the court upon some subsidiary or collateral matter ... not
disposing of the merits, but adjudicating a preliminary point or directing some step in
the proceeding." BLACK, supra, at 5. Moreover, in Black's lexicon, judgments were
exclusively those decisions made by a court "organized under the laws of the particu-
lar sovereignty." Decisions by "arbitrators or of any self-constituted tribunal" were not
"judgments." Id. at 7.
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"judgment" to use to describe a case's conclusion. 146 But when doing
so, as explained in Part II above, the 1938 drafters were not focused
on involving judges in settlement.
Courts did, however, have a longstanding practice-one dating
back centuries-of entering agreements that parties made. Pollack
and Maitland describe the "seisen under a fine" to be the "final con-
cord levied in the king's court"; it was "in substance a conveyance of
land and in form a compromise of an action."'147 They report that
sometimes that conclusion came from "serious litigation" and other
times from compromise. 148 The recordation in courts created proof
of the fact of the obligation and facilitated enforcement, given that
"contractual actions, actions on mere covenants, were but slowly mak-
ing their way to the royal court."'149 Moreover, compromising without
approval was an offense because removing cases from courts' dockets
required permission. 150 According to Pollack and Maitland, some-
times judges provided some supervision prior to granting permission
and refused "irregular fines."'
151
Moving centuries forward and across an ocean, commentary and
case law in the United States generally assumed without much analysis
that consent decrees were available. Debate existed about whether
consent decrees were better understood as private contracts or as judi-
cial acts. 152 As federal courts became more involved in the structural
injunctions produced through antitrust, school desegregation, em-
ployment, and prison reform litigation, the Supreme Court developed
more doctrine around this genre of decisionmaking. As the Court
explained, consent decrees have "attributes both of contracts andjudi-
146 See FED. R. Crv. P. 54; FED. R. CIv. P. 58, 1938 Federal Rules, supra note 3. In
lectures explaining those rules, William D. Mitchell (the Chair of the Advisory Com-
mittee and a former Attorney General) explained that the term judgment "includes a
decree and any order from which an appeal lies." See Hon. William D. Mitchell, Third
Lecture, in Lectures Analyzing and Explaining the New Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, in RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
ANNOTATED AND APPENDIX at 155, 200 (1938) (also noting that "[w]herever you see
the word 'judgment' in these rules, it includes an appealable order").
147 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 94-97 (2d ed. 1898).
148 Id. at 98.
149 Id. at 100-01.
150 Id. at 98.
151 Id. at 99.
152 See 3 A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OFJUDGMENTS 773-74 (Edward W.
Tuttle ed., 5th ed. 1925); WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, A TREATISE ON EQUITY PLEADING
AND PRACTICE 724-25 (1902); BLACK, supra note 145, at 3-4.
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cial decrees,"153 embodying an agreement of the parties "that the par-
ties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a
judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other
judgments and decrees." 154 Some constraints on judicial entry have
followed, including that such decrees must "be directed to protecting
federal interests," "spring from, and serve to resolve, a dispute within
the court's subject matter jurisdiction; must come within the general
scope of the case made by the pleadings; and must further the objec-
tives of the law upon which the complaint was based." 155
2. Collapsing or Making Distinctions Among Consent Decrees,
Judgments, and Settlements
Less clear is whether those rules ought to apply to what some
judges have called "private settlements." The Fourth Circuit recently
suggested that consent decrees are a special kind of resolution that
often entails both some oversight prior to their entry by the rendering
court and then ongoing enforcement by that rendering court. The
court gave class action, shareholder derivative, and bankruptcy cases
as examples. In contrast, runs this distinction, a private settlement
"ordinarily does not receive the approval of the court."156 In the case
making that distinction, the Fourth Circuit undertook an indepen-
dent inquiry into whether a document designated by a district court as
a "consent decree" fit that circuit's parameters. 157
Further muddying the waters are other efforts to distinguish
among kinds of consent decrees as well as between those aspects of a
153 See Local No. 92, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519
(1986) (quoting United States v. ITT Continental Banking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37
(1975)).
154 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk CountyJail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992). Returning
to the nineteenth century, Black argued that Blackstone originated the idea of ajudg-
ment as a contract, arguably one that could not be impaired by law, but that the
opposite view, "supported by numerous and respectable American authorities," was
that judgments were not "in any sense a contract." BLACK, supra note 145, at 11-13.
155 Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899, 903 (2004) (reiterating these criteria from
earlier decisions).
156 Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 279-81 (4th Cir. 2002). The court explained
that our "federal courts have neither the authority nor the resources to review and
approve the settlement of every case brought in the federal system." Id. at 280 (quot-
ing Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 835 (3d Cir.
1995)).
157 Id. at 282-85 (concluding that it did not, making attorneys ineligible for attor-
neys' fee awards as prevailing parties under the Fourth Circuit's application of Buck-
hannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,
532 U.S. 598 (2001)).
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judgment predicated upon adjudication and those aspects concluded
by consent. For example, the Second Circuit has proffered a delinea-
tion between "a true 'consent judgment"' (defined as one in which
"all of the relief is agreed to by the parties") 158 and a "settlement judg-
ment" (defined as one in which, while the "parties have agreed on the
components of the judgment," they have not agreed on all the details
or "the wording of the judgment," and the judge "is obliged to deter-
mine the detailed terms of the relief and the wording"159). Another
variation on the theme comes from the Supreme Court decision in
Martin v. Wilks, 160 in which the majority and the dissent disagreed
about what aspects of the litigation about employment discrimination
in the Birmingham, Alabama, fire department had been adjudicated
and what settled.
3. Keeping or Making Judicial Power
The Fourth Circuit's effort to set "consent decrees" apart from
"private settlement" sits uneasily with the approach suggested by the
Supreme Court in the 1994 decision of Kokkonen v. Guardian Life In-
surance Co. of America.161 There, in a unanimous decision by Justice
Scalia, the Court held that by agreeing to dismiss the lawsuit, the par-
ties had not settled their case in a manner that permitted federal
judges to enforce the oral agreement allegedly made. The Court also
discussed how parties and courts could craft settlement documents
that would generate enforcement powers in the federal system.
162
158 Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1986).
159 Id.; see also Manning v. N.Y. Univ., 299 F.3d 156, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2002) (rebuff-
ing a pro se litigant's disagreements with two provisions of a settlement and invoking
Janus Films for judges' authority to "implement the framework settlement it en-
dorsed"). In a different context, the Fifth Circuit invoked the distinction drawn in
Janus Films. See United States v. Spruill, 292 F.3d 207, 217-18 (5th Cir. 2002) (vacat-
ing a conviction because of the lack of a holding of a hearing on an indictment, as
required by a statute, and quoting Janus Films for its delineation of a "true 'consent
judgment' [in which] all of the relief to be provided by the judgment and all of the
wording to effectuate that relief is agreed to by the parties" from a "'settlement judg-
ment' [in which] the parties have agreed on the components of a judgment ... but
have not agreed on all of the details or wording of the judgment").
160 490 U.S. 755 (1989). InJustice Stevens's dissent, id. at 774-75, he character-
ized the lower court activity as a "genuine adversary proceeding" followed by the entry
of consent decrees that were based on and influenced by facts found. The majority
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist focused instead on the entry of the consent de-
crees and did not discuss the district court's factfinding on the underlying claims of
discrimination. Id. at 759-60.
161 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
162 Id. at 376-81.
2005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The Kokkonen litigation had been predicated on diversity jurisdic-
tion. Once dismissed, no independent bases of federal jurisdiction
supported a second lawsuit. 163 While concluding that no ancillary ju-
risdiction existed, the Kokkonen Court offered two possible routes to
creating such jurisdiction. The parties either could include a "sepa-
rate provision" to retain jurisdiction or they could incorporate "the
terms of the settlement agreement" in the order of the dismissal. Yet,
because the Court used tentative and suggestive phrases in its dicta
exploring these options, the Kokkonen ruling gave no guarantees.
1 64
163 That fact has proved important in other decisions. See, e.g., Board of Trustees
of the Hotel & Rest. Employees Local 25 v. Madison Hotel, 97 F.3d 1479, 1480 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (concluding that regardless "of whether ancillary jurisdiction existed over
the second suit after the stipulated dismissal of the first suit, the court was endowed
with independent subject matter jurisdiction over the second suit under ERISA").
Another opinion from that circuit, Shaffer v. Veneman, 325 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
concluded that an agreement that "merely settles" federal claims for specified consid-
eration and does not require any interpretation of the provisions of federal rights
does not provide an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In that case,
the D.C. Circuit also concluded that ancillary jurisdiction was unavailable because the
order of dismissal failed to provide for it. Id. at 373-74. Shaffer involved a claim by an
African-American farmer, Lloyd Shaffer, against the United States Department of Ag-
riculture. Mr. Shaffer had been a named plaintiff in a class action, Pigford v. Glickman,
a lawsuit alleging that the Department of Agriculture had discriminated against black
farmers in violation of both the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the APA. Mr.
Shaffer's settlement required that he opt out of the Pigford settlement, and Mr. Shaf-
fer filed for enforcement when the Department of Agriculture denied his 2000 loan
application. Id. at 371.
The settlement in Pigford also did not conclude the conflict. See Shaila K. Dewan,
Black Farmers' Refrain: Where's All Our Money?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, at 14. That
article described the 1999 settlement, including payments of about $814 million to
more than 13,000 farmers but the rejection of some 80,000 other claims due to fail-
ures to file within the time limits required by the settlement. Further, according to
the report, plaintiffs' lawyers believe the Department of Agriculture had too vigor-
ously opposed the filing of timely applications. Some faulted the settlement agree-
ment for its terms, such as that, while the Department of Agriculture admitted
discrimination, black farmers continued to have the evidentiary burdens of showing
where they had farmed during the last decades of the twentieth century and that they
had complained about discrimination.
164 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381. The decision states that if the parties "wish to pro-
vide for the court's enforcement of a dismissal-producing settlement agreement, they
can seek to do so." Id. (emphasis in the original). As the Court explained, if parties
contract between themselves to settle a case and file a notice of dismissal (under Rule
41-Dismissal of Actions-of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) and do no more,
then the withdrawal of the lawsuit ends the jurisdiction of the federal courts unless an
independent basis for jurisdiction exists. Id. But the Court suggested that parties
could use the provision in Rule 41(a) (2), specifying that no action shall "be dismissed
at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper," to require that compliance with a settlement
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One way to read the speculative language of the opinion is as a re-
quest to ruledrafters to clarify the processes of settlement. Another is
that the Court was unprepared to decide definitely how and when an-
cillary federal jurisdiction was to be available for post-settlement con-
flict resolution. 
6 5
Whatever prompted the Court's lack of specificity, as a technical
matter, exactly how to establish federal jurisdiction after Kokkonen re-
mains unclear. Several decisions demonstrate that many lawyers are
not adept at drafting agreements that result in federal courts' reten-
tion of jurisdiction and, further, that many lower court judges disa-
gree about what Kokkonen requires.1 66 As the Third Circuit put it,
"painful lesson [s] result"; a "frequently-encountered situation" is that
litigants, "having agreed on the terms of a settlement but not having
fully implemented" those terms, "obtain a dismissal from the district
court" and then are trapped by losing the enforcement power of the
federal courts.
16 7
The consequence is that a cluster of decisions now rehearse who
said what to whom during negotiations, who wrote what thereafter,
or retention ofjurisdiction was a term of the dismissal-thereby protecting the future
enforcement power of the court. Id. at 381-82. Further, the Court said "we think the
court is authorized to embody the settlement contract in its dismissal" if the parties
agree to the retention of jurisdiction and the court does so pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1)(ii). Id. at 381.
165 Another is to read that language as creating a presumption against federal
jurisdiction, as Judge Wallace argued in dissent in Re/Max International, Inc. v. Realty
One, Inc., 271 F.3d 633, 650-52 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 987 (2002).
166 See, e.g., Hehl v. City of Avon Lake, 90 Fed. Appx. 797, 802 (6th Cir. 2004) (not
for publication) (reversing a district court for enforcing a settlement agreement and
holding that the settlement agreement and order did not include language sufficient
for retention ofjurisdiction); Cranshire Capital, L.P. v. CBTV-STAR, LW, Inc., 70 Fed.
Appx. 434, 435-37 (9th Cir. 2003) (not for publication) (deciding, over a dissent by
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, who argued that jurisdiction had been lost, that 'Jurisdic-
tion retaining" language in the settlement agreement sufficed to keep enforcement
power); Re/Max, 271 F.3d at 650 (holding, over a dissent by Judge Clifford Wallace
arguing that the Court had lost jurisdiction, that enforcementjurisdiction existed and
requiring enforcement).
167 See Shaffer v. GTE N., Inc., 284 F.3d 500, 501 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that
the publication of the decision was aimed at instructing lawyers on how to keep juris-
diction if they so desired or to delay the loss of jurisdiction until it was no longer
needed). The Third Circuit held that the phrase "pursuant to the terms of the Settle-
ment" in a dismissal order was "insufficient to incorporate the terms of the settlement
agreement and therefore did not confer subject matter jurisdiction over settlement
enforcement." Id. at 503 (citing In rePhar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., 172 F.3d 270, 274 (3d
Cir. 1999)). Further, the Third Circuit clarified that permitting the reinstatement of
the action is not sufficient because that revives the "underlying claim" rather than
permitting enforcement of the bargain reached. Id. at 503-04.
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and whether district court orders of dismissal used the words "en-
force," "alter," "reopen," or "reinstate." Courts then determine which
of those words or other provisions suffice to permit enforcement of
settlements by the federal judges that entered them. 168 Federal en-
forcement problems also arise because of concerns for comity in the
federal system. In some instances, even when ancillary jurisdiction ex-
ists, certain kinds of enforcement efforts-such as preventing parallel
state actions-may be unavailable.
169
Under the current doctrinal regime, trial judges do have some
methods by which to exercise power. If trial judges respond to post-
settlement disputes by vacating dismissal orders, those reinstatement
rulings cannot be appealed immediately. That rule emerged in Digital
Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,170 decided in the same year that
the Court announced Kokkonen. In Digital Equipment, The Court held
that an order vacating a dismissal predicated upon a settlement agree-
168 See, e.g., Re/Max, 271 F.3d at 637-40, 638 n.3 (reproducing dialogue about the
settlement negotiations and detailing the exchange of correspondence as well as the
provisions of a status conference and concluding that references to "settlement talks"
did not suffice to incorporate the terms of a settlement agreement but that the or-
der's language sufficed to retain jurisdiction even though it did not do so expressly,
with a dissent by Judge Wallace that the dismissal order noted the power to "alteY' the
terms of an agreement but not the power to "enforce" such terms) (emphasis in the
original); McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., 229 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 905 (2001) (concluding that the incorporation in a dismis-
sal order of "only a single term of the parties' 20-page settlement agreement" was
insufficient to retain ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement); Schaefer Fan
Co. v.J & D Mfg., 265 F.3d 1282, 1287, 1291-93 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (concluding that the
words "pursuant to a confidential settlement agreement" manifested intent to retain
jurisdiction, over a dissent by Judge Dyk arguing that under Kokkonen the language
was insufficient); In re Bond, 254 F.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
apparent intent of the district court to keep jurisdiction was not the "deliberate re-
tention" required); In re T2 Medical, Inc. Shareholder Litig. (Bender v. Allegra), 130
F.3d 990, 991, 995 (lth Cir. 1997) (upholding a district court refusal to take jurisdic-
tion based on a view that the effort to enforce was an effort to modify the settlement
and occasioning a dissent from Judge Anderson, concluding that enforcement was at
issue); Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (relying on the term
"reopen" to find jurisdiction); Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 76 F.3d 37, 40-42 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that a dismissal order that neither incorporated the settlement agree-
ment nor retained jurisdiction over the entire agreement was not enforceable in fed-
eral court). See generally Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the
Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS LJ. 9, 52-61 (1996) (also raising the possibility of using
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 as another route to federal jurisdiction).
169 See Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33-34 (2002) (hold-
ing that federal court retention ofjurisdiction over a settled class action through its
ancillary jurisdiction did not give judges the power to use the All Writs Act to remove
parallel state cases, even when settlement provisions required dismissal of such cases).




ment did not fit within the "collateral" order doctrine that permits a
non-final decision to be reviewed upon its entry.' 7' In addition to be-
ing able to revive cases, judges enforcing consent decrees have the
power to order their modification. 172
Return then to the Fourth Circuit's twin criteria for a "consent
decree" as contrasted with a "private settlement"-that consent de-
crees require ongoing oversight prior to entry of the decree and ongo-
ing enforcement powers after entry. 173 The Supreme Court's decision
in Kokkonen and the evolving practice under the Federal Rules under-
cut the coherence of both distinctions. Specifically, lawyers drafting
stipulations in light of Kokkonen are well advised to put in require-
ments for ongoing enforcement authority. Further, lawyers might go
further, for one way to try to avoid the problem illustrated by Kokkonen
is to seek the entry of a consent judgment instead of a stipulation of
dismissal. 174 Moreover, if the distinctive feature of a "private settle-
ment" is the absence of the judge (ex ante and ex post), that distinc-
tion is blurred by the Federal Rules, which direct judges to be a
presence in pretrial settlement procedures.
Consider also the question of the allocation of power between the
state and federal systems. Over the decades, as judges have promoted
the entry of settlement, they have also generated interest in having
post-judgment enforcement proceedings in the same courts that en-
teredjudgment. Should federal ancillary jurisdiction grow under the
rationale that federal interests are served by creating settlement incen-
tives through facilitating the subsequent enforcement of settle-
ments? 175 For some, such a proposal would be unappealing because it
171 Id. The doctrine is built on earlier decisions, focused on whether an issue was
important, discrete, separate from the merits, and most importantly, not remediable
readily, were a litigant required to wait until the conclusion of the lawsuit. The deci-
sion of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949), is an
example; there the Court held that a refusal of "security for expenses"-the posting
of a bond by a shareholder bringing a derivative action-could be appealed immedi-
ately. The doctrine is called "Cohen appealability," but it has been narrowed through
subsequent applications.
172 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992) (providing
a more flexible standard for modification when institutional reform litigation is
involved).
173 See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 279-81 (4th Cir. 2002), discussed supra
notes 156-57.
174 See Morton Denlow, Federal Jurisdiction in the Enforcement of Settlement Agreements:
Kokkonen Revisited, 2003 FED. CTS. L. REv. 2, at http://www.fclr.org/articles/2003
fedctslrev2.pdf. Magistrate Judge Denlow provided a set of suggestions for retaining
jurisdiction, including properly worded consent decrees. Id. at 18-19.
175 Cf Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing
to federalize many state class actions).
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would take such contract disputes out of state courts where in this
federated polity, they "ought" to be, especially if the obligations of Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins176 require the application of state substantive con-
tract rights. But, as I discuss below, what is developing is a federal
common law of such contracts, implicitly justified as appropriate form
in light of the "federal interests" in the enforcement of the bargains
struck.17
7
4. The Nature of Judicial Power and the Propriety of Its Exercise
Questions also relate to the very idea of federal judicial power.
When parties withdraw or settle a lawsuit, does a "case or controversy"
required by Article III of the United States Constitution remain, or
does the agreement to withdraw the case extinguish the power of the
federal courts to act to enter the settlement? In 1983, (then) Justice
Rehnquist so suggested when dissenting from a summary affirmance
of the settlement in the AT&T antitrust litigation. 178 However, as I
detailed in Part III above, during the decades since, members of the
judiciary and of Congress have generally embraced judicial settlement
in both civil and criminal litigation-making unlikely any ruling that
would render them unavailable mechanisms by which to conclude
lawsuits. The power ofjudges to "act without judgment" has grown, as
purportedly foundational principles of federal jurisdiction recede in
favor of claims for what such contracts can accomplish.179 As the insis-
tence on judicial settlement activities makes plain, the utility of (or
infatuation with) contract has carried the day. 180
176 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
177 See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29
(1994) (holding that a settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment for
mootness).
178 Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1004 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Burger, C.J., White, J.).
179 SeeJudith Resnik, Judging Consent, 2 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 63-84, 99-102 (1987)
[hereinafter Resnik, judging Consent].
180 According to a recent study by the Federal Judicial Center, analyses of disposi-
tions for civil cases terminated between 1997 and 2001 indicate that "22% were dis-
missed as settled and 2% were terminated on consentjudgments. Another 10% were
voluntary dismissals, and some of those probably were settled. An additional 20% are
coded as 'other' dismissals." ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, SHANNON R. WHEATMAN,
MARIE LEARY, NATACHA BLAIN, STEVEN S. GENSLER, GEORGE CORT & DEAN MILETICH,
FED.JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED SETrLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 1 n.1
(2004) [hereinafter SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS]. These data are yet further evi-
dence of the confused state of the procedure for settlement, since the techniques by
which cases are "dismissed as settled" as contrasted with "terminated by consent judg-
ments" are not specified.
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Atop the issue of the existence ofjudicial power is a related prob-
lem of what obligations judges should or do shoulder when involved
in settlements.1 8' As the discussion of litigants' confusion about keep-
ing federal jurisdiction suggests, judges might see their job as includ-
ing efforts to avoid misperceptions about agreements as well as
clarifying or facilitating access to return to the court that entered the
settlements if disputes about its meaning erupt thereafter. One could
seek to require jurists, when considering either dismissals or consent
decrees, to scan the terms to ensure that all participants in the settle-
ment share the same understanding about the terms of an agreement
and the availability of post-settlement relief in federal court. Further,
in an effort to avoid post-settlement conflicts, one could impose on
judges an obligation to review draft contracts to check for vague terms
and unclear provisions so as to learn about whether a true "meeting of
the minds" has taken place or whether "mutual mistakes" animate an
agreement.1 82 Additional inquiry could be required: that judges en-
sure that settling parties were knowledgeable about the risks and ad-
vantages of continuing to litigate when they agreed instead to settle
claims. Yet another option would be to rely on the judge to be a
source of information about the quality of a proposed agreement.
Were such responsibilities to flow, the model of consent judg-
ments in class actions would be transposed in some respects to the
individual "private" context. In aggregate litigation, the judge is en-
listed to protect absent class members from misbehavior by their des-
ignated representatives. Judges sit as a kind of "fiduciary" for the
absentees, 83 first to decide if a proposed settlement is sufficiently
181 These issues are not unique to the law of the United States alone. See, e.g.,
Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust and Conjoined Cases, [2004] EWCA Civ.
576, 4 All E.R. 920 (Eng. Ct. App. Civ. Div. 2004) (addressing whether a court may
impose sanctions on a successful litigant who refused to participate in an ADR pro-
cess). Given the "uncertainty" about the issue, materials were supplied by several in-
tervenors (the Law Society, the Civil Mediation Council, the ADR Group, and the
Center for Effective Dispute Resolution). The Court held that the court's role was to
.encourage, not to compel," id. para. 11, and that whether a party unreasonably re-
fused ADR depends on the individual case, including but not limited to the merits,
the degree to which alternatives might impose either cost or delay, and the
probability of success. Id. para. 16.
182 Those terms are common in contract law.
183 The term "fiduciary" can be found in several cases in which judges discuss their
work on behalf of absent class action members. See, e.g., Grunin v. Int'l House of
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975) (describing the district court as a "fiduci-
ary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members"). See generally
Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and
Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. Riv. 1239 (arguing that judges ought not and cannot
take on that role in that kind of case).
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plausible so as to notice the class and then to conduct a hearing in
order to decide whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. The challenge forjurists is to serve (at least temporarily) as
the protector of one party to a lawsuit that might switch from a concil-
iatory posture to an adversarial one. Not only may that role be awk-
ward for a judge otherwise chartered to treat both sides of a lawsuit
equally, but the assignment to judges to assess the adequacy of con-
sent (and therefore to be open to rejecting settlements and insisting
on litigation) is also in tension with the judicial promotion of settle-
ment. In theory, judges of consent ought to be agnostic about
whether litigants either settle or insist on adjudication. But judicial
"priors"-mandated by federal rules-put them in the mode of being
"pro-consent" and therefore at risk of discounting information that
makes it problematic.
Further, judges have limited capacity to insist that disputants in-
tent on settling return instead to adversarial litigation. In the criminal
context, that difficulty is translated into a doctrine requiring judges
generally to assent to prosecutorial requests to dismiss criminal indict-
ments. 184 Moreover, the practical job of judging consent is challeng-
ing. As is exemplified by the case law on class actions and plea
bargaining, judges depend upon parties for information, and when
those parties seek to settle lawsuits, judges have a difficult time ob-
taining knowledge about why a proposed outcome ought to be re-
jected. Even in instances when objectors come forth, judges must be
attentive to the strategic opportunities presented by "holding up" a
settlement; some who complain seek to be "bought off."
Concerns within the judiciary about the quality of the bargaining
and the adequacy of representation in large-scale cases have become
so profound that, in 2003, rulemakers amended the class action rule
to give trial judges more authority to police the appointment of class
counsel, to learn about side settlements that give better terms to indi-
viduals than to the class, and to evaluate the fairness of settlements. 185
These amendments may not be optimal given the tensions created
when judges are asked to judge consent.186 But they represent a view
184 See FED. R. ClM. P. 48(a); United States v. Garcia-Valenzuela, 232 F.3d 1003,
1008 (9th Cir. 2000) (reiterating the standard that judges may refuse dismissal only if
"clearly contrary to manifest public interest"); United States v. Hamm, 638 F.2d 823,
828 (5th Cir. 1981) (obliging deference to prosecutorial discretion unless "clearly
wrong").
185 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (g), (h), and the Advisory Committee's Notes (explaining
the 2003 amendments).
186 See Resnik, Judging Consent, supra note 179, at 85-102.
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that when courts create vehicles for binding absent parties, obliga-
tions to the absentees arise.
Other concerns about the exercise of judicial power in civil settle-
ment are beginning to appear in case law, rules, and commentary.
One issue, debated through variations in local rules, is about which
judge should participate in negotiations. Some districts advise that
the judge assigned to the case (especially if a bench trial is antici-
pated) may or ought not (absent parties' consent) also serve as a set-
tlementjudge. 187 In addition to assignment to either another district
judge or to a magistrate judge, delegation to special masters is an op-
tion-especially since 2003, when the rule governing appointment of
special masters expressly embraced assignment of pretrial activities in-
cluding some tasks "that ajudge might feel not free to undertake." 188
Implicitly, the various practices address due process concerns that in-
formation gained through settlement negotiations may affect deci-
sions rendered through adjudication or that judicial involvement in
settlement undermines its volitional qualities. A different kind of ob-
jection to judicial involvement comes from experts on mediation who
argue that a judge assigned a case cannot "mediate"-in the true
meaning of that term-because the judge has too much official power
to function as required in that facilitative role.
189
187 See, e.g., E.D. CAL. Civ. LOCAL R. 16-270(b) (2) (2004) ("Unless all the parties
affirmatively request that the Judge or Magistrate Judge assigned to try the action
participate in the conference . . . the Judge or Magistrate Judge assigned to try the
action shall not conduct the settlement conference . . . ."); S.D. CAL. Ciy. LOCAL R.
16.3 (2003) ("The judge conducting the settlement conference will be disqualified
from trying the case unless there is an agreement by all the parties to waive this re-
striction."); D. HAw. LOCAL R. 16.5(a) (2004) (requiring a written stipulation by coun-
sel if "the judge trying the case conducts the settlement conference"); D. IDAHO
LOCAL Clv. RULE 16.4(b) (2004) (providing as "a general rule" that the assignedjudge
not conduct settlement conferences and that "matters or information discussed dur-
ing the conference" not be communicated to the assigned judge); LOCAL Civ. R. E.D.
OKLA. 16-3 (2004) ("The Settlement Judge will take no part in adjudicating the case
subsequent to the settlement conference."); E.D. TENN. LOCAL R. 68.3(e) (2004)
("The judicial officer participating in the settlement conference shall be a neutral
mediator and facilitator and shall play absolutely no role in the adjudication of the
case once he is designated as settlement judge.").
188 Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 Amendments to FED. R. CIv. P. 53(a)(1)
(noting that "[s]ome forms of settlement negotiations, investigations, or administra-
tion of an organization are familiar examples of duties that ajudge might not feel free
to undertake").
189 My thanks to the Honorable Nancy Atlas, United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, for explaining this approach to me. See also Scott Atlas &
Nancy Atlas, Potential ADR Backlash: Where Have All the Trials Gone? To Mediation or
Arbitration, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2004, at 14; Edward J. Brunet, Judicial Media-
tion and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232 (2002).
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If judges participate, how they are to behave is at issue. Do the
norms ofjudicial behavior, such as prohibitions on discussions outside
the hearing of opponents and proceedings in open court and on the
record-all developed in the context of adjudication-apply? For ex-
ample, should all parties (in person and/or through lawyers) be pre-
sent whenever ajudge is involved? Reflecting general attitudes against
ex parte communications,190 some judges do not negotiate individu-
ally with parties unless the parties agree otherwise. (Whether, in the
midst of a discussion, a lawyer is well-advised to reject a judge's offer
to talk separately with either side is another question.) In contrast,
some districts have local rules specifically licensing judges to meet
'Jointly or individually" with opponents, with and sometimes without
their lawyers. 19' Further, in general, the custom appears to be that
such meetings are rarely "on the record." As Richard Posner (writing
for the Seventh Circuit) has commented, "[n]o one supposes that
there is any impropriety in a judge's conducting settlement discus-
sions off the record," as he also noted that such a practice is
commonplace.192
But the fact that such a custom has evolved does not necessarily
validate its desirability. As Judge Posner noted in an oft-cited opinion
(In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.) using the extraordinary power of man-
damus to review a class action certification, settlement pressures are a
substantial problem that law should address. 193 His focus in that deci-
190 See, e.g., COLO. D.C. LoCAL R. 77.7 (2004) (prohibiting lawyers from approach-
ingjudges ex parte, in writing or orally); M.D. GA. LoCAL R. 9(a) (2004) (requiring
lawyers to avoid ex parte communications tojudges about pending cases); NEV. LOcAL
R. 7-6 (2004) (prohibiting ex parte communications). See generally AMERICAN BAR AS.
SOCIATION, MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)7 (1999). One of the ex-
ceptions listed on when ex parte communication may occur is that ajudge may "with
the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an
effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge." Id. Canon 3(B) (7) (d).
191 See, e.g., LocAL R. E.D. OKLA. 16-3 (2004) ("The SettlementJudge has the right
to meet jointly or individually with the parties and/or the corporate representatives
without the presence of counsel."); LocAL R. N.D. OKLA. 16.2 (2004) (The settlement
judge may . .. meet jointly or individually with counsel, alone or with the parties or
persons or representatives interested in the outcome of the case without the presence
of counsel."); LoCAL ADR R. E.D.N.C. 101.1 (2004) ("During the settlement confer-
ence, the settlement judge or magistrate judge may also confer ex parte with any
parties .... ").
192 Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding
that a plaintiff who did not request that a settlement agreement reached at a confer-
ence with ajudge be recorded was bound by that magistrate judge's recollection of its
terms).
193 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995). Whether class
certification does put defendants in a coercive position is a subject of debate. See
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sion was on what he viewed as improper judicial authorization for
plaintiffs to proceed in the aggregate, thereby altering the stakes and
incentives of defendants. Such concern about the distribution of
power ought also to apply when the source of settlement pressures is
the judiciary. That some judges exert such pressure can be seen from
the admonition in the notes to Rule 16 cautioning judges against forc-
ing settlement on the unwilling 94 as well as in the case law reversing
judges for entering settlements too quickly, 195 and in commentary on
how judicial "nudging" of litigants towards settlement ought to oc-
cur.196 Further, as some case law describes, judges may help to shape
agreements and, in situations of conflict, also decide who had agreed
to what.197 Indeed, Judge Posner suggested that if 'judicial recollec-
tion" was the "only means of resolving such a dispute satisfactorily,"
then judges could take the stand or offer to be questioned by par-
ties. 198 As the embeddedness ofjudges in civil settlement negotiations
becomes increasingly clear, the need to regulate the judicial role
should be acknowledged.
My argument is that two options are available. If the law insists
that parties engage in settlement discussions and place judges in those
interactions, then regulation is required. A burden parallel to that
imposed on judges in class actions and under a few statutory provi-
sions such as the Fair Labor Standards Act1 99 ought to flow from the
new mandates to judges to bring about settlements in small-scale
cases. Further, national rules should prohibit the judge assigned to
try a case from participating in the negotiations about its disposition.
Alternatively, national rules could retreat from the commitment to re-
quiring parties to negotiate and from placing judges in that process.
Charles Silver, We're Scared to Death: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1357 (2003).
194 See Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 amendments to then-Rule 16(c) (7).
195 See, e.g., Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2001); Kothe v. Smith,
771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985).
196 See Denlow & Schack, supra note 79, at 22 (describing efforts by federal magis-
trate judges in Chicago to collect data on settlements to provide "objective data on
cases that actually settle" and thus to be "used as a tool to nudge parties toward settle-
ment"). For discussion of the problems ofjudicial pressures to settle, see also Atlas &
Atlas, supra note 189; Brunet, supra note 189.
197 On the growth of judicial power, see Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Dis-
cretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1561 (2003).
198 Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2002).
199 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000); see also Stalnaker v. Novar Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d
1260, 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (explaining that ajudge is to "scrutinize the settlement
for fairness" and ensure that it reflects a "reasonable compromise").
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A model of disengagement (itself not wholly satisfactory) is pro-
vided by the criminal side, with constitutional doctrine and rules ad-
dressing the judicial role in plea bargaining. Federal judges are
generally enlisted only after the prosecutor and defendant have con-
cluded their bargaining.20 0 The entry of a plea bargain is conditioned
upon a judicial determination that a defendant deliberately waived a
variety of constitutional rights. Judicial engagement at that stage
serves to buffer the imbalance of power between criminal defendant
and the state by protecting a defendant from misinformation coming
from either the prosecution or from a defense lawyer failing to de-
brief a client on all the options and risks. 20 1 Federal judges are pre-
cluded from participating in the negotiations to avoid either the fact
or impression that they favor settlement in general or a particular
agreement. 20 2 The goal is to protect judicial capacity to inquire into
whether a criminal defendant entered into an agreement "knowingly"
and "voluntarily."20 3 In practice, some of those inquiries are pro
200 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c)(1) ("The court may not participate in these discus-
sions."); United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1976) (granting a petition for
mandamus to prevent a judge from participating in plea bargain agreements), cert.
denied sub nom. Santos-Figueroa v. United States, 429 U.S. 926 (1976); United States v.
Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding that district judges may not
"intervene in the plea agreement process absent a showing of fraud" and refusing to
rely completely on an analogy between plea bargains and contract law that might have
permitted a judge to intervene to clarify that a mutual agreement, based upon a
shared understanding, had been achieved); see also C.D. CAL. LOCAL. CIM. R. 57-3.1
(2004) (providing that the judge "assigned to preside over a complex criminal
case ... may' ask if parties desire a settlement conference but shall not participate in
facilitating settlement"); Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of
Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 136-37 (1999) (discussing the limited role
of federal judges in plea bargaining).
A few courts have read Rule 11 as precluding the judge presiding to participate
but permitting "other judges to serve as facilitators for reaching a plea agreement
between the government and the defendant." See Advisory Committee Notes to the
2002 amendments to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c)(1)(A) (citing United States v. Torres, 999
F.2d 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1993)). The Advisory Committee left the language in place
"with the understanding that doing so was in no way intended either to approve or
disapprove the existing law interpreting that provision." Id.
201 See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003); King, supra note 200.
202 As one court explained, the criminal rules' prohibition on judicial participa-
tion in plea bargaining is to protect the "parties against pressure to settle criminal
cases on terms favored by the judge"-implicitly someone who might seek to influ-
ence either prosecution or defense to alter their positions. See United States v. Lar-
rios, 39 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1994).
203 Federal criminal rules operationalize these obligations, imposed by the Su-
preme Court as a predicate to judicial acceptance of a guilty plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
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forma yet serve thereafter to insulate criminal settlements from subse-
quent attacks through habeas corpus petitions seeking to vacate pleas.
This constrained posture has the advantage of not placing the
weight of judicial authority behind the obligation to bargain or a par-
ticular deal offered. Yet it can also challenge jurists, as is illustrated by
a case in which a trial judge worried about a defendant's declining a
proposed plea and being exposed to a much harsher sentence if he
insisted on going to trial. The Ninth Circuit vacated the plea because
the participation by the judge, while "rational and humane" as well as
"compassionate and well-motivated" ("qualities important to the
proper performance of one's judicial duties") was nonetheless "coer-
cive."'204 But it is that very form of coercion (again, also justifiable as
rational, human, and well-motivated) that the federal rules and judi-
cial practices now embrace on the civil side, which licenses judicial
promotion of and involvement in settlement.
B. Settling What? Binding Whom? Individual and Aggregate Problems
The lack of clarity about how to effectuate a settlement is mir-
rored by the muddiness of many settlement negotiations. Examples
come from the increasing number of cases debating the existence and
meaning of settlements. While some state procedural rules specify
that a binding settlement requires a signed writing or an agreement
made in "open court,"20 5 the federal courts do not currently have an
equivalent national rule. Questions emerge repeatedly about whether
agreements have in fact been made. Some federal courts have en-
forced some oral agreements despite the absence of a written agree-
ment. Further, some enforcement rulings rely on information from
trial judges who add their own language to or recollections about the
bargains made.
20 6
11(b); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969). Voluntariness can be found even when various forms of coercion-such
as the risk of far greater punishment if an agreement is not accepted-are present.
See infra notes 270-76 and accompanying text.
204 United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 557 (9th Cir. 1992).
205 See e.g., NEB. COUNTY CT. GEN. R. 4 (2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2104 (McKinney
2004); WA. Sup. CT. Ctv. R. 2A (2004); Wis. STAT. § 807.05 (2004).
206 See, e.g., Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., 73 F.3d 1276, 1283 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting
that the parties' agreement had not been reduced to writing nor signed in open court
but that the reasonable reliance upon it made its enforcement appropriate); Brock-
man v. Sweetwater County Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 93-8052, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 10095,
at *5-6 (10th Cir. May 5, 1994) (denoted "not binding precedent") (affirming a dis-
trict court's order holding enforceable a settlement of an employment discrimination
claim-despite the plaintiff's claim that no final agreement on all the terms had been
reached-when the agreement came from an oral agreement between a teacher and
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For example, the Seventh Circuit has concluded that a magistrate
judge's recollection of an oral agreement to settle a lawsuit prevented
a party from reinstating that case.20 7 On the other hand, opined that
Circuit, when material issues have been left unresolved, districtjudges
ought not to yield to the "temptation to dismiss a case prematurely
before a settlement has truly been finalized."208 The Sixth Circuit has
overruled a judge insisting that a settlement was reached when parties
disagreed about the drafts reducing that agreement to writing and the
district court judge chose one version.20 9 Similarly, the Third Circuit
found unenforceable an agreement after a litigant argued that her
attorney did not have the authority to settle and that the judge failed
to ensure her assent when conducting a brief hearing on the question
of whether a settlement had occurred and had ignored her letters
"personally disavowing" her attorney's authority.210
Such problems-about the authority to bind, the terms of the
agreement, and the roles of lawyers and judges-mirror those seen in
large-scale cases, when factions of lawyers representing different co-
horts of clients either seek to control outcomes for their own subset of
clients, challenge the power of others, or contest judicial approval of
settlements. 2 1' Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windso7 12 and Ortiz v.
a school district and a transcript of a discussion of its drafting with a magistrate
judge); Pratt v. Philbrook, 38 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69-70 (D. Mass. 1999) (detailing the
course of an alleged repudiation of a settlement and the lack of agreement).
207 Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting
also that the parties did not contest the recollection); see also Laserage Tech. Corp. v.
Laserage Labs., Inc., 972 F.2d 799, 802-04 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding a district
judge's conclusion that a binding settlement agreement existed).
208 Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2001).
209 Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 217 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 2000).
210 Brief for the Appellant at *5-6, 10-15 (filed Sept. 19, 2000), Shaffer v. GTE N.,
Inc., 284 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-1486, 01-1707). The Third Circuit held
that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Shaffer v.
GTE N., Inc., 284 F.3d 500, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2002). In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit
has permitted enforcement when a litigant challenged an agreement. See Murchison
v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1994) (enforcing a settle-
ment read in open court and noting that the party protesting the authority of his
lawyer to settle was an "educated man who understood the terms of the settlement
agreement," knew his attorney was negotiating, and should have objected at the
time). Another variation comes from a Third Circuit case addressing a dispute be-
tween an insured and an insurance company about the company's authority to enter
into a settlement of a Title VII claim to which the individual defendants objected for
its failure to clear them. The district court had enjoined the settlement and the cir-
cuit reversed. See Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Klaskey, 68 F.3d 828 (3d
Cir. 1995).
211 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settle-
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Fibreboard Corp.213 are placeholders for these problems. In each, the
Supreme Court found unsatisfactory district court approval of agree-
ments to conclude an asbestos class action. Several other decisions-
Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown,21 4 Adams v. Robertson,2 15 and Devlin v.
Scardelletti2 6-offer variations on the theme, with objections raised by
some members of classes to the agreements generated by others.
2 17
Whether on the grand scale or the individual, bargaining is compli-
cated, and bargaining for preclusion and the power of judicial en-
forcement ups the stakes.
2 18
In addition to questions about the existence and legitimacy of
settlements, several cases address disputes about the terms agreed
upon. The facts of the 1994 Kokkonen case are illustrative. In Kok-
konen, the underlying dispute was between an insurance agent and a
company for whom he had worked. After a trial had concluded but
before the judge had instructed the jury, an agreement was forged
ment of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1159 (1995); see
also Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs Counsel in
Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REv. 1465 (1998).
212 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
213 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
214 511 U.S. 117, 122 (1994) (dismissing the writ-over a dissent by Justice
O'Connor joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy-in part because of
the possibility that the question about a constitutional right to opt out of a primarily
monetary class action was hypothetical and in part because of a "settlement designed
to moot the petition").
215 520 U.S. 83, 85 (1997) (dismissing as improvidently granted the writ on the
question of whether the Alabama courts' approval of a class action settlement under
which all class members were not permitted to exclude themselves violated due pro-
cess because the question had not been properly presented to the state courts).
216 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (holding that non-named class action members who
made timely objections to a class action settlement had the "power to bring an appeal
without first intervening" at the trial level).
217 See also Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001) (ruling on
the ability of a settlement to preclude claims allegedly not extant at the time of its
conclusion), affd in part by an equally divided court, 539 U.S. 111 (2003); Keystone
Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 238 F. Supp. 2d 151, 157-58 (D.D.C. 2002)
(describing efforts by plaintiffs to prevent settlement discussions with individuals in a
proposed class action). Controversy about settlements entered by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have also been met with challenges by indi-
vidual employees, disputing the propriety of an agreement. See, e.g., Binker v.
Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1992).
218 Illustrative are a few cases recognizing that nonparties, with stakes in an out-
come that are "discernible from the record," and who participated at the trial level,
may, if the equities warrant, be heard on appeal to challenge the enforcement of a
settlement. See, e.g., Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 186 F.3d 346,
349-50 (3d Cir. 1999).
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and "summarized . . . on the record in chambers." 219 Guardian later
claimed that Mr. Kokkonen's failure to "return certain files" breached
that agreement. 220 Mr. Kokkonen argued that the agreement had not
"required him to turn over his personal 'agent' client files or prohib-
ited him from servicing his clients by forwarding certain insurance
forms and claims to Guardian on behalf of his clients who were
Guardian policyholders and insureds." 22I Further, the parties de-
bated whether the trial judge expected to retain jurisdiction. Guard-
ian, the party seeking enforcement, claimed that the judge had taken
an "active role . . . in clarifying" the terms of the agreement and
"plainly anticipated that any proceeding to enforce the settlement
agreement would require an appearance before him and not in state
court."222 The trial judge agreed, relying on his own personal recol-
lection of the settlement agreement when rejecting Mr. Kokkonen's
arguments. 223 As noted above, the Supreme Court nevertheless con-
cluded that, given the dismissal of the action without more, the fed-
eral court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. These various
examples of bargaining confusion demonstrate again the need for
regulation-from requirements that agreements be recorded in open
court to different rules for contracts entered into under the aegis of
courts, as I address below.
C. The Bargain's Terms
Another kind of question is about the substantive provisions of
settlements made under courts' wings. As the history of criminal plea
bargaining demonstrates, courts set conditions under which bargain-
219 Brief of the Merits of Petitioner at *5, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511
U.S. 375 (1994) (No. 93-263), available at 1993 WL 639313.
220 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Guardian Life
argued that Mr. Kokkonen
in bad faith breached material terms of the settlement agreement by refus-
ing to return certain Guardian files, despite having agreed unequivocally to
return all Guardian files or files containing information about Guardian pol-
icyholders... [and that] Kokkonen also breached the settlement agreement
by communicating with Guardian on behalf of a client and Guardian policy-
holder, which he specifically had agreed not to do.
Brief for Respondents at *4, Kokkonen (No. 93-263), available at 1994 WL 137026.
221 Brief on the Merits of Petitioner at *6 n.9, Kokkonen (No. 93-263), available at
1993 WL 639313. Kokkonen also argued that the "oral settlement agreement be-
tween the parties was never reduced to writing, at the insistence of Guardian." Id. at
*5.
222 Brief for Respondents at *4, Kokkonen (No. 93-263), available at 1994 WL
137026.
223 Id. at *5 (citing the Joint Appendix at 181, Kokkonen (No. 93-263)).
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ing occurs. 224 One could assume that settlement contracts are like
any other, with parties' bargaining limited by whatever constraints re-
side in doctrines of unconscionability and public policy limitations.
225
Public policy of course is dynamic, as is evidenced by the shift in atti-
tudes towards ex ante contracts to arbitrate federal statutory claims
that are now, in the main, enforceable 226 with arbitrators often given
the initial opportunity to interpret their terms.227 The question then
is what public policy ought to be.
224 See FISHER, supra note 201; King, supra note 200; see also Stephanos Bibas, Pleas'
Progress, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1022 (2004) (reviewing FISHER, supra note 201, agreeing
with his analysis that prosecutors and judges have incentives to support a system of
plea bargaining, and arguing that defense attorneys also have institutional incentives
that help that system to dominate); Anup Malani, Habeas Bargaining (Sept. 6, 2004)
(advocating that Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be modified to
permit judges to amend sentences to facilitate settlement of habeas corpus petitions,
and that such settlements be subjected to supervision by the court as it does under
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=617361 (manuscript on file with author).
225 See, e.g., United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853,
856 (9th Cir. 1992) ("A settlement agreement is treated as any other contract for
purposes of interpretation."); Brockman v. Sweetwater County Sch. Dist. No. 1, No.
93-8052, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1009, at *5-6 (10th Cir. May 5, 1994) (denoted "not
binding precedent").
226 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that
the FAA applied to employment contracts and that arbitration agreements involving
employees seeking to pursue state-based discrimination claims could be enforced).
Only signatories are bound. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002)
(holding that, although an individual signing a form job application may be barred
from pursuing discrimination claims, the EEOC's independent statutory cause of ac-
tion is not barred). See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of
Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REv.
1017 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931 (1999);Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory
Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1 (2000); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 1489, 107th
Cong. (2001) (proposing to exclude litigation under various federal discrimination
claims from arbitration agreements made before disputes arise).
227 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (requiring that
the question of whether arbitration contracts preclude class actions is one to be de-
cided initially by an arbitrator rather than by judges). Further, the burden of showing
that financial costs of arbitration or other forms of contractual ADR undermine their
sufficiency as a means of vindicating statutory rights rests with opponents to those
processes. See Green Tree Fin. Servs. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000). In the
wake of this ruling, some lower courts have authorized discovery into the processes
provided by particular contractual ADR programs. One complexity is the relationship
between state and federal law. State law typically governs questions of unconscionabil-
ity of contracts, prompting a question about whether federal law, through the FAA,
preempts state law doctrine. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
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My view is that bargaining required by courts ought to result in
limitations on the kinds of bargains that courts endorse. That ap-
proach is starting to be reflected in law, with examples including con-
straints on parties' abilities to contract for courts to vacate prior
(otherwise valid) rulings, warnings about enforcement of "most fa-
vored nations' clauses," limitations on parties' capacity to bargain for
sealed records, and efforts to force honesty in negotiations through
enforcement of only those settlements accompanied by good faith dis-
closure of relevant facts. Below, I detail some of the debates about
what lines should be drawn.
The question of bargaining over statutory rights to attorneys' fees
prompted a spate of case law in the 1980s. The Third Circuit banned
the practice, 228 but the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that nego-
tiating about fee waivers was not inconsistent with the legislative provi-
sion of rights to fees for prevailing parties, and that lower courts could
approve class settlements with such provisions. 229 A lawyerly response
has followed in which public interest lawyers warn clients about this
possibility to inhibit their interest in agreeing to settlements contin-
gent on their lawyers not obtaining statutorily-authorized fees.
230
Another term in some bargains-vacatur of lower court orders-
caused heated exchanges in the 1990s. In one state, an appellate
judge was threatened with sanctions by a disciplinary body for refusing
to condone the practice of permitting parties to enter settlements that
required vacatur of orders that had neither factual nor legal errors.
23'
Some jurists promoted that practice as reflective of the public policy
in favor of settlements and as giving appropriate control to parties
(conceived as owning the litigation). Other judges objected that vaca-
tur created incentives to delay settlements until after judges or juries
Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (declining to enforce an arbitration clause); Sutton's
Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc., 776 So. 2d 589 (La. App. 2000) (find-
ing the arbitration clause unenforceable under state law because the contract was
adhesive); Sutton Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc., 875 So. 2d 1062 (La.
App. 2004) (upholding, in a subsequent decision, the class certification); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002). See generally Stempel, supra note
106.
228 See Prandini v. Nat'l Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
229 Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
230 To do so, retainer agreements describe defendants' interest in having fees
waived as well as the organization's dependence on statutorily-authorized fees.
231 See, e.g., Henry Weinstein, Appeals Judge Denied "Willful Misconduct" in Writing
Dissent, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1998, at A22. The disciplinary action was subsequently
dismissed. See Panel Dismisses Judicial Misconduct Charges, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1999, at
A28.
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had ruled, that it imposed unfair costs on third parties, and that it
undermined public confidence in the legal system.
2 32
The federal system has come to frown on such agreements, 2 33 as
have some state legislatures. After the California Supreme Court re-
quired courts to implement vacatur of trial court decisions absent ex-
traordinary circumstances, 2 34 the California legislature enacted a
provision precluding appellate courts from reversing or vacating "a
duly entered judgment upon an agreement" absent findings of "no
reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will
be adversely affected" and that the reasons for reversal outweighed
"the erosion of public trust that might result" as well as the risk that
"the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pre-
trial settlement.
'" 235
A different kind of term-common in certain kinds of cases-is a
"most favored nations clause," which comes in a few forms. The idea
motivating these provisions is the interest in achieving settlements
with some litigants even when other similarly situated litigants have
either not yet agreed to do so or may not even have filed claims. To
address inter-litigant disparity arising in sequences of cases involving
separately-filed lawsuits against the same party, a settlement agree-
ment can include a provision (a "most favored nations clause") that, if
later settling litigants do better, the originally-settling individual or
group may have their awards adjusted upwards. Thus, these clauses
can enable a series of settlements with similar terms applied to compa-
232 Compare Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Winters, J.) (defending the practice), with Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v.
Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook,J.) (objecting to the prac-
tice), and In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.)
(again objecting). See generally Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Pref-
erences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41
UCLA L. REv. 1471 (1994); Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating
Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 589 (1991);
Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal in
the California Supreme Court, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1033 (1993).
233 See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) (con-
cluding that a settlement cannot, absent extraordinary circumstances, be the basis for
vacatur of a judgment under review). A few courts have nonetheless found "excep-
tional circumstances" justifying vacatur of a judgment. See, e.g., Major League Base-
ball Props. v. Pac. Trading Cards, 150 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 1998). The presumption
against withdrawing opinions has also been applied at the district court level. See, e.g.,
Avellino v. Herron, 181 F.R.D. 294 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
234 See Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992).
235 See CAL. Civ. P. CODE § 128(a) (8) (A)-(B) (West 2004).
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rable litigants. 236 Some courts frown on unconditional most favored
nations clauses; judges debate whether the clauses facilitate or create
disincentives for subsequent settlements because they potentially re-
quire additional payments to earlier settlers. 237 Further, depending
on the wording, parties may disagree about when obligations arise
under these clauses and turn to judges to resolve such disputes. 238
Judicial enforcement-or refusal to do so-of these kinds of terms
create another technique for influencing the kinds of agreements
made, albeit one dependent upon after-the-fact party protest.
More generally, courts may refuse to enforce entire agreements.
For example, in the Digital Equipment case (the Supreme Court ruling
mentioned above, holding that a district court's refusal to enforce a
settlement was not an immediately appealable order), a post-settle-
ment dispute emerged from allegations of fraud in the settlement pro-
cess. One of the parties obtained a vacatur of the settlement
agreement because of what the trial court concluded was a failure "to
disclose material facts.., during settlement negotiations which would
have resulted in rejection of the settlement offer."23 9 Expanding on
that approach, an ex ante regulatory intervention could require forms
of disclosure either between the parties (akin to discovery rights) or to
the court (akin to obligations under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and when settling class actions under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), so that court-based bargaining
is predicated on better information than is bargaining in other
settings.
236 An example of such a clause can be found in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litigation, 752 F.2d 137, 140 n.3 (5th Cir. 1985). Commentators have argued both the
desirability and the costs of these clauses. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Spier, Tied to the Mast:
Most-Favored Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts, 32J. LEGAL STUD. 91 (2003); MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 13.23 (4th ed. 2004).
237 See Fisher Brothers v. Phelps Dodge U.S. Indus., Inc., 614 F. Supp. 377, 381-82
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
238 See, e.g., Cintech Industrial Coatings, Inc. v. Bennett Industries, Inc., 85 F.3d
1198 (6th Cir. 1996). That court also noted that some courts disfavor these clauses
because they can be "disruptive in the orderly disposition" of complex litigation, id. at
1203, which is to say that the clauses can generate more requests for adjudication.
239 Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. 833, 866 (1994) (quoting the
petition for a writ of certiorari at 13a). According to the brief submitted by Desktop
Direct, Digital's chief executive officer had led Desktop's chief executive officer to
believe that the alleged infringement had been an "innocent mistake" and that by
settling "without the involvement of attorneys," the problem could be handled simply
and without complications. Brief of Respondent at *3, Digital Equip. (No. 93-405),
available at 1994 WL 249425. Desktop's CEO later allegedly learned that Digital's
chief officer had used the Desktop Direct name against counsel's advice and that the
case for "willful infringement" was strong. Id. at *4.
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Third-party access to information about court-contracts is an-
other question to be addressed. Different forms of confidentiality and
of secrecy about events or information produced in or through litiga-
tion are possible.2 40 Parties may conclude agreements by dismissals
and, in separate contracts that are neither filed with courts nor refer-
enced in notices of dismissal, they may agree to terms that no other
people can readily access and they may also agree (in "confidentiality
clauses") to refuse disclosure of the terms to others. A good deal of
case law and commentary refers to the existence of such "confidential
settlement agreements," 241 suggesting that they occur with some fre-
quency. In addition to party-negotiated terms, confidentiality require-
ments may also come through rules that emanate from privately-
provided dispute resolution programs, from claim payment systems
created through mass tort settlements, and from ADR programs spon-
sored by the public.2
42
A question for courts is whether to enact rules regulating such
provisions or, if breaches are alleged, whether to enforce such
terms.243 Courts can also have doctrine that is information-forcing.
240 See generally Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders and Public Access to
Courts, 105 HARv. L. Rrv. 427 (1991); Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality
Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 457.
241 See, e.g., Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206 (9th
Cir. 2002) (discussing access to confidential settlement materials); Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Housing Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding good cause to
protect disclosure of a settlement that the plaintiff had reached in a prior lawsuit with
a different defendant).
242 For example, the Dalkon Shield litigation concluded with a trust authorized to
make payments to claimants. See Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61 FoRDtam L. REv. 617 (1992) (describing the trust's
insistence on evaluating each case individually); Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 79
(1997). The trust did not provide to the public information about the amounts paid
to individuals; claimants represented by lawyers who appeared repeatedly may have
gathered information through informal networks. According to one of the trustees,
the decision not to disclose was to ensure that each claimant's payment was individu-
alized. See E-mail from Professor Georgene Vairo to the author (Oct. 22, 2004) (on
file with the author).
243 See, e.g., Llerena v.J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2002) (permitting one employee, alleging sexual harassment by an employer, access
to a settlement agreement between that employer and another employee that those
parties had deemed confidential). The court provided limited access, accompanied
by a protective order, authorizing only the plaintiff, her lawyers, and her experts ac-
cess to information about the prior settlement. Id. at 739.
Enforcement questions intersect with obligations to accord full faith and credit
to judgments of other jurisdictions. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222
(1998) (concluding that a Michigan injunction, entered as part of a settlement of a
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Under Kokkonen, for example, incorporation of settlement terms into
notices of dismissal or into consent judgments is useful (and perhaps
necessary) to maintain federal jurisdiction. Once filed, the presump-
tion of public access to court records comes into play. A question for
legislators is whether to enact regulations about these practices. For
example, in some states, parties' confidentiality agreements are over-
ridden by laws requiring that professionals or insurance companies
disclose settlements made for certain kinds of claims, such as those
involving medical malpractice and settled for more than a fixed
amount.
244
These regulations have emerged in part in response to public
outcry about "secret" settlements in cases involving sexual abuse of
children by priests, exposure to toxic wastes, and injuries from design
defects. 245 One federal district-the District of South Carolina-has
responded with a local rule prohibiting sealed settlements, 246 while
another district-the Eastern District of Michigan-limits the dura-
tion for sealing.2 47 Statutory responses include "Sunshine in Litiga-
tion Acts" found in some states248 with comparable proposals made,
but not enacted, federally.
249
lawsuit between a former employee and General Motors and providing that the em-
ployee not testify about a particular product "without the prior written consent of
General Motors Corporation, either upon deposition or at trial, as an expert witness,
or as a witness of any kind, and from consulting the attorneys or their agents in any
litigation already filed or to be filed in the future" did not shield any witness from the
subpoena power of Missouri in another lawsuit involving persons not parties to the
first case).
244 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-17a (2003) (requiring that, "upon entry of any
medical malpractice award or upon entering a settlement of a malpractice claim"
against those licensed under other provisions, the entity making payment or the party
are to notify the Department of Public Health of "the terms of the award or settle-
ment" as well as providing a copy and the complaint and answer). Efforts to block
New Jersey's statute providing for public disclosure of the dates and amounts of mal-
practice judgments were recently refused in Medical Society of New Jersey v. Mottola, 320
F. Supp. 2d 254 (D.NJ. 2004).
245 SeeJoseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case
Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711 (2004).
246 See D.S.C. LocAL R. 5.03(E) (2004) (providing that "no settlement agreement
filed with the Court shall be sealed pursuant to the terms of this Rule"). In addition,
any party seeking to "file documents under seal" must file a motion to do so and
specify the documents sought to be sealed, explain the necessity for sealing, and
whether "less drastic alternatives" would not "afford adequate protection. Id. See gen-
erally Symposium, Court-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV 711 (2004).
247 See E.D. MICH. LocAL R. 5.4 (2003).
248 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2004).
249 See, e.g., Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2003, S. 817, 108th Cong. (2003).
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These proposals, focused on discovery and settlement processes,
may well assume the availability of information on outcomes in adjudi-
cated cases. In some respects that assumption is apt, albeit with cave-
ats. Between seventy and eighty percent of the federal appellate
decisions made annually are designated as either not "published"
and/or not available for citation by other litigants except under nar-
row circumstances. 250 Whatever the restrictions on use, many of those
"unpublished" decisions are made available by online databases and
more recently in their own federal "reporter"-West's Federal Appen-
dix-begun in 2001.251
The possibility of federal regulation of "secrecy in courts" has
prompted the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), which is a research arm
of the federal judiciary, to attempt to ascertain the frequency and dis-
tribution of such provisions in federal litigation. That task is hard be-
cause, as the case law discussed above illustrates, notices of dismissal
may incorporate settlements but not specify their terms. FJC research-
ers examined court records to learn how often docket sheets them-
selves revealed sealing of settlements. 252 From a sample of fifty-two of
the ninety-four federal district courts, researchers culled more than
280,000 docket filings and found court-sealed settlement agreements
250 Under the rules of some federal circuit courts, "unpublished" decisions cannot
be invoked as precedent, a practice some argue is unconstitutional. See Anastasoff v.
United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc). Although vacated, that decision helped to develop a critique. See
generally Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix, The
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1 (2002); Lauren
Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Prece-
dent in an Interpretive Community, 35 INn. L. REv. 399 (2002); Unpublished Judicial Opin-
ions: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property,
107th Cong. (2002).
In 2003, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules proposed amending Rule 32 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to prohibit the limitation on citation of
decisions for precedent. The American Bar Association supported this change to
.promote transparency" and to "help level the playing field between large litigants
and smaller parties that lack the resources to perform exhaustive legal searches." But
in June of 2004, the federal judicial committee in charge decided that more study was
needed on the proposed rules' potential effects on the time to disposition. See Appel-
late Rule Revision Postponed, 72 U.S.L.W. 2767 (June 22, 2004) (describing the decisions
of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States); see also Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal
of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1435 (2004).
251 As to state decisions, see Arthur G. Scotland, The Filing and Publication of Appel-
late Opinions: A Survey of the Council of ChiefJudges of Courts of Appeal, JUDGES' J., Winter
2004, at 31.
252 SEALED SETrLEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 180.
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in a small number-227 cases or under one-half of one percent. 253
The researchers found examples of sealing in a range of kinds of cases
(including personal injury, employment, civil rights, and contract
cases) with higher rates of confidentiality in certain kinds of cases,
such as those filed under the Fair Labor Standards Act.25 4 The re-
searchers concluded that in at least two-fifths of the cases identified,
sealing occurred when cases had features making them of "special
public interest."
2 55
One might infer from the relative rarity of docket sheets that
mention sealing that the practice is itself rare. An alternative explana-
tion is that sealing court dockets is not the predominant mode of
maintaining the confidentiality of the terms of agreements. Rather,
parties may rely heavily on contracts that require confidentiality and
leave whatever conflicting allegations are on court records to the pub-
lic realm.
The difficult problem of ascertaining the frequency of confiden-
tial settlements ought not to obscure the normative question of
whether legislators or judges should put the possibility of confidential-
ity "off the table"-as an item that cannot be bought and sold when
lawsuits are concluded. The question in turn requires thinking about
whether the public dimensions of an adjudicatory model (with trials
as its most vivid expression) that make possible scrutiny of both the
facts prompting conflict and of the resolution 256 should be extrapo-
lated to the new litigation system in which much is done through mo-
tions, pretrial processes, and settlement. The clearest statements of
right of public access come in the context of the criminal trial.
257
On the civil side, constitutional commitments anchored in the
First Amendment and the Due Process Clauses, coupled with common
253 Id. at 3. Summaries of the cases are provided in Appendix C.
254 Id. (noting that Fair Labor Standards Act cases had a rate of sealing almost six
times the overall average).
255 Id. at 7. That such cases are ones in which sealing occurs can also be seen from
the non-random production of case law. The Ninth Circuit, for example, recently
reviewed a blanket protective order making secret a good deal of discovery related to
alleged fraud by an insurance company. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
331 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003). The circuit court held that a "presumption of access"
attached to discovery materials submitted in conjunction with dispositive motions and
remanded for the trial court to revisit its ban on access. Id. at 1136; see also Stalnaker
v. Novar Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (approving a settlement in a
Fair Labor Standards Act case but ordering that it be unsealed).
256 SeeJudith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 405 (1987);
Emily Bazelon, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be
Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 155 (1999).
257 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 488 U.S. 555 (1980).
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law rights of access to judicial proceedings, secure public access to at
least court-based hearings. Some commentators argue further that a
general presumption of public access exists for all documents filed
with the court. 258 Under that rubric, some courts have assumed that
access to filed settlements is generally required.2
59 As the Eleventh
Circuit explained, it is
immaterial whether the sealing of the record is an integral part of a
negotiated settlement between the parties, even if the settlement
comes with the court's active encouragement. Once a matter is
brought before a court for resolution, it is no longer solely the par-
ties' case, but also the public's case. Absent a showing of extraordi-
nary circumstances. .. , the court file must remain accessible to the
public.
2 60
In contrast, some judges have denied access to settlement agreements
that are not filed with courts; as the Second Circuit recently ex-
plained, "honoring the parties' express wish for confidentiality may
facilitate settlement. ' 261 Further, courts have distinguished among
the kinds of documents in a court's file, for example providing access
to discovery material annexed to substantive motions but ruling that
"material filed with discovery motions is not subject to the common-
law right of access."
262
But even a rule making entire files "accessible" does not guaran-
tee public knowledge but rather depends upon what is filed with
courts. Amendments to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
now provide that parties do not have to file discovery.
263 Only if
materials obtained through discovery are reflected in motions or affi-
258 SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 180, at 1.
259 See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800
F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986); Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Auth., 281 F.3d 634 (7th Cir.
2002);Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2002); Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983
F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1993).
260 Brown v. Advantage Engineering, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (lth Cir. 1992);
see alsoJessup, 277 F.3d 926 (requiring disclosure of a settlement because it had been
filed with the court).
261 See, e.g., Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2004)
(concluding that when settlements are conditioned on confidentiality and do not in-
clude information on amounts paid, no disclosure was required). Gambale also con-
cluded that despite the dismissal of the action (without any Kokkonen-like jurisdiction
vesting language), courts retained jurisdiction to deal with materials in their files. Id.
at 141; see also Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994) (remand-
ing for the district court to consider the utility of confidentiality).
262 See, e.g., Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304,
1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
263 See FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d) (as amended in 2000).
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davits does the information have the potential to become public.
And, we know that parties bargain to hide the information that they
unearth in discovery. A headline-grabbing example comes from re-
cent litigation involving sex discrimination at a Wall Street brokerage
firm. As one report put it about the settlement of a sex discrimination
case against Morgan Stanley, although the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) had
planned to introduce statistics about women's pay and promotion at
trial, details on the alleged disparities between the firm's male and
female employees were never made public .... As part of the settle-
ment, the parties agreed to honor a pre-existing confidentiality or-
der, designed to keep many of the documents under wraps. 264
In short, information suppression can occur through settlement,
through agreements entered into during the course of litigation (in-
cluding that discovery be "buried" or "burned"), and through bar-
gains that require a lawyer to decline to represent other similarly
situated plaintiffs (in other words, buying the lawyer off of a genre of
cases). Further, ADR can also serve as a means of limiting access to
information, as many states have created a privilege for information
obtained in mediations. Federal law providing for mediation has a
similar feature. 265 Conflicts are now emerging about whether,
through bringing documents and information into a mediation, par-
ties can successfully shelter them from subsequent disclosure in litiga-
tion.266 Critics of such practices propose turning to state ethics laws to
264 See Kate Kelly & Colleen Debaise, Morgan Stanley Settles Bias Suit for $54 Million,
WALL ST. J., July 13, 2004, at Al; see also Susan Antilla, Op-ed, Money Talks, Women
Don't, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at A19 (arguing that "Morgan Stanley, and all of Wall
Street, scored" by keeping the statistics private). Antilla raised concerns about the
EEOC's agreement to the settlement with that as a condition. In contrast, in advance,
the focus was on the public disclosures that were to come. See Patrick McGeehan, The
Women of Wall Street Get Their Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 3 (Business), at
5.
265 See 5 U.S.C. § 574 (2000) (requiring confidentiality, and specifically for discov-
ery, of voluntary exchanges by a "neutral" or by parties of alternative dispute resolu-
tion in administrative processes); 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2000) (requiring district courts
to provide local rules for confidentiality in ADR); cf FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d
736 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (concluding that this section does not prevent use of evidence
disclosed at mediation to challenge a settlement agreement). See generally Ellen E.
Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and Mediation-World-
wide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553 (2005); Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation,
98 HARv. L. REv. 441 (1984).
266 See, e.g., Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 270-71 (Cal. 2004) (holding that
a mediation privilege applied to "writings" that include analyses of test data and pho-
tographs prepared "for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to a mediation"
and that a "good cause exception" did not apply). Several courts have concluded that
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constrain lawyers from restricting public access to information that
might pose "substantial danger to the public health or safety."
267
Such bargaining about information reflects a more general con-
cern about unequal power. Inequality of resources between litigants
is a familiar problem inside courts. Constitutional doctrine has im-
posed obligations to equip poor criminal defendants as well as a small
sliver of civil litigants-those faced with termination of parental
rights. 268 Further, as noted, federal rules insist on judicial oversight of
guilty pleas because of the fear that the state could overreach and that
the defendant might be poorly counseled. One might, therefore,
have thought that such concerns would also have resulted in judicial
efforts to limit the kinds of bargains that prosecutors can make with
defendants. 269 However, judges have instead shaped doctrines nota-
bly tolerant of bargaining inequality on both the criminal and the civil
side.
A powerful and poignant example of the acceptance of bargain-
ing among unequals comes also from the 2004 decision of Blakely v.
Washington,270 in which a majority concluded that judges lacked the
power to enhance sentences if the underlying facts had not been
proved to ajury or stipulated to by the defendant. 271 As Justice Scalia
explained for the majority: "Our Constitution and the common-law
traditions it entrenches ... do not admit the contention that facts are
better discovered by judicial inquisition than by adversarial testing
before a jury."2 7 2 This decision has profound implications for deter-
statements made in mediation are privileged. See, e.g., Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n v.
Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
Pa. v. Price, 78 P.3d 1138 (Colo. Ct. App 2003); State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Free-
dom of Info. Comm'n, 709 A.2d 1129 (Conn. 1998); see also Deason, supra note 265
(proposing more protection for confidentiality in mediation). A few examples of nar-
row construction of the privilege can be found. See, e.g., Ala. Dep't of Transp. v. Land
Energy, Ltd., 886 So. 2d 787, 796 (Ala. 2004).
267 See, e.g., Richard A. Zitrin, Written Testimony to the American Bar Association's
Center for Professional Responsibility, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/zitrin.html (Oct. 5,
2001) (proposing this amendment to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2(B) but
the change was not enacted).
268 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); M.L.B. v. S.LJ.,
519 U.S. 102 (1996). See generally Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 20, at 2120-43.
269 See King, supra note 200, at 136 (arguing for much greater judicial involve-
ment). The tension in part comes from the view that, given separation of powers,
judges ought not infringe upon executive decisionmaking.
270 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
271 Id. at 2537-38.
272 Id. at 2543. In contrast, in United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per
curiam), the Court had permitted judges to consider, at sentencing, evidence of con-
duct of which a defendant had been acquitted.
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minate sentencing schemes, with more decisions by the Supreme
Court soon to come,2 73 but my interest is in what the Court had to say
about negotiation -about contract-as an alternative to jury factfind-
ing. Even as Justice Scalia's majority decision insisted on the constitu-
tional requirement of factfinding, it also embraced the option of
contracting out of such rights.
The discussion of the alternative option to contract out of rights
was accompanied by an acknowledgment of the significant imbalance
of power between prosecution and defense. The majority explained,
"nothing prevents a defendant" from agreeing in a plea bargain with
the prosecutor to waive rights to jury factfinding, to stipulate relevant
facts, or to consent to factfinding by judges on questions related to
sentencing. 274 While the dissenters objected that the majority's hold-
ing would increase prosecutorial discretion in a system in which adju-
dication is functionally unavailable and more than ninety percent of
the cases are settled through plea bargaining, the majority replied
that its insistence on rights to adjudication did not affect the respec-
tive bargaining positions of prosecutor and defendant. As the Court
put it, for the prosecutor, "there is already no shortage of in terrorem
tools." 2 75 That reference is to an array of current legal doctrines per-
mitting prosecutors to drop and to add charges including those in-
The dissenters interpreted the majority to require that "any fact that increases
the upper bound of ajudge's sentencing discretion is an element of the offense." See
id. at 2546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Breyer and in part by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy). Justice Kennedy filed a separate dissent,
joined by Justice Breyer, to point out that the majority insisted on a separation of
functions rather than appreciating sentencing guidelines as a "collaborative process."
Id. at 2550-51. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, also wrote separately and
discussed how the decision "threaten [s] the fairness of our traditional criminal justice
system." Id. at 2552. Note that downward departures, awarding more lenient
sentences, do not raise that problem.
Some lower courts have since concluded that the federal sentencing guidelines
are unconstitutional as well as called upon the Supreme Court to provide a rapid
response to the growing conflict, while others have limited their sentences only to
facts proven or stipulated, sometimes resulting in sentences within, and sometimes
below, guideline ranges. See, e.g., United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir.
2004); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 11
(2004). An expedited schedule for Supreme Court review has followed.
273 The Court so noted. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540. Several Supreme Court
decisions, relating to distinctions between sentencing factors and elements of crimes,
are not all easily aligned and have sometimes prompted sharp divisions within the
Court. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000); Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998); United States v. Watts,
519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
274 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541.
275 Id. at 2542.
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volving the death penalty, permitting judges to impose harsher
sentences on remands from appeals won by defendants as long as
judges identify facts supporting the additional punishment, and rec-
ognizing the waiver of appellate rights as acceptable for prosecutors to
extract when bargaining.276 Thus, contemporary interpretations of
"our Constitution and the common-law traditions it entrenches" are
complacent about putting defendants to the choice of insisting on a
trial at the risk of receiving a far greater punishment than would have
resulted from agreeing to a bargain.
Parallels exist on the civil side. For example, in Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, decided in 1991, the Supreme Court upheld a fo-
rum selection clause that sent two passengers from Washington State
who brought a negligence claim against a cruise line to Florida-all
because the ticket they bought included ("at its lower left-hand cor-
ner") a requirement that its acceptance obliged passengers to agree to
litigate claims there.277 While the Court reserved some modicum of
'judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness," 278 unequal bargaining po-
sitions, the lack of bargaining altogether, and the provision of the
clause upon receipt of a purchased ticket did not persuade the major-
ity, who argued the utility of organizing and centralizing litigation.
279
276 For example, the Advisory Committee on the Criminal Rules explained a 1999
amendment as made "to reflect the increasing practice of including provisions in plea
agreements which require the defendant to waive certain appellate rights." See Advi-
sory Committee Notes to the 1999 amendments to FED. R. CmIM. P. 11(c)(6). The
2002 amendments reorganized the rule and deleted that subdivision.
Current federal sentencing guidelines also facilitate negotiations of particular
kinds, for example by making available sentence reductions for defendants who ac-
cept responsibility by pleading guilty. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1 (2003).
277 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587 (1991).
278 Id. at 595.
279 Id. at 594-95. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall in dissent, concluded
that disparate bargaining positions, the adhesive nature of the contract, and concern
about limitations imposed on courts' jurisdiction, ought to have made the contract
unenforceable. Id. at 597, 600-07.
In the case's wake (pun intended), many courts have enforced forum selection
clauses, including those that send litigants to venues far from their homes. See, e.g.,
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. M.V. DSR Atlantic, 131 F.3d 1336 (9th Cir. 1997) (requir-
ing litigation in Korea); M.B. Restaurants, Inc. v. CKE Restaurants, Inc., 183 F.3d 750
(8th Cir. 1999) (upholding the obligation under a contract, alleged to have been
procured through fraud, that franchisees from South Dakota bring complaints in
Utah, which would provide an opportunity to present the claim); see also Carbajal v. H
& R Block Tax Serv., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906-07 (7th Cir. 2004) (enforcing such a
clause mandating that arbitration occur in Minnesota and leaving the question of
whether "any particular federal statute overrides the parties' autonomy and makes a
given entitlement not waivable" to the arbitrator).
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As these concerns about efficiency in the management of both
civil and criminal litigation illustrate, the turn to Contract Procedure
comes from many sources including-as Blakely's dissenters under-
score-that while individual adjudication is a protected right, most
people cannot afford its pursuit either because of a lack of resources
or because of its high risks. Yet in this arena of vivid inequality, one
can find little interest in judicial oversight of the deals struck. What
Blakely, Carnival Cruise, and arbitration cases such as Circuit City28 o
teach is that courts are willing to rely on individual consent even as
they know that such consent is given under conditions of profound
inequality. 281
In short, bargaining per se is no panacea. At times, distress about
certain terms in bargains have prompted some rules for Contract Pro-
cedure, mostly working at the margins and coming from episodic stat-
utory enactments, amendments to rules, and by case law. In the law of
settlement as judges have made it thus far, courts have been a source
of the growing obligation to bargain but not of many means to im-
prove the ability of litigants to bargain.
D. Process Failures
Yet other problems arise when deals fall apart. As noted above,
some settlement agreements are oral, not written. Under the contract
law of many jurisdictions, oral agreements are enforceable, and courts
have relied upon that premise to enforce settlement contracts that are
A few cases do provide, however, that factfinding may be a prerequisite to en-
forcement to determine whether the party opposing enforcement can meet the
"heavy burden of proof' that enforcement would be "unreasonable and unjust or that
the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or over-reaching." See Murphy v.
Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12, 15 (1972)).
280 See notes 104-06, supra.
281 Administrative schemes (represented in Blakely by the example of sentencing
guidelines) generate presumptive outcomes across categories of claimants and
thereby reduce some of the transaction costs which in turn may reduce some of the
problems of the inequality of resources of the disputants. Parallels on the civil side
include compensation systems such as those for disabilities, illnesses from vaccines,
and for Black Lung disease. See, e.g., National Vaccine Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12
(2000) (creating a special set of masters, sitting under non-life tenured judges in the
Court of Federal Claims, to do factfinding in cases in involving such injuries); Black
Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000) (providing a program for injuries
from coal mining dust). While such processes offer some reduction in expense and
some regularization of discretion, they do so at the price of vivid instances of unfair-
ness because of the refusal to invest resources in individualization.
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not reduced to writing.28 2 On the other hand, some states require
signed written agreements as a predicate to enforcement. 28 3 But even
when agreements are written, differences of interpretation can result,
raising the problem of the role of the court in choosing how much
information to entertain.
In 1969, when faced with a failure to comply with a settlement
agreement, the D.C. Circuit stated that a "motion to enforce a settle-
ment contract is neither ordinary nor routine. s2 8 4 Now, more than
thirty years later, such motions are increasingly common.28 5 Thus,
one question is what process is required when courts face such mo-
tions and which judges ought to rule on them. The D.C. Circuit an-
swer, circa 1969, was that, when facts were in dispute, entitlements to
evidentiary hearings follow.28 6 In short, Contract Procedure requires
282 See, e.g., Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters v. New Century Bankcorp,
99 Fed. Appx. 15, 21 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Scheuner Corp., 841 F.2d 151, 154 (6th
Cir. 1988).
283 See MICH. CT. R. 2.507(H). That section requires that an
agreement or consent between the parties or their attorneys respecting the
proceedings in an action, subsequently denied by either party, is not binding
unless it was made in open court, or unless evidence of the agreement is in
writing, subscribed by the party against whom the agreement is offered or by
the party's attorney.
Id. Similar provisions can be found in several states. See, e.g., N.D. R. CT. 11.3 (2004);
Wis. STAT. § 807.05 (2003); S.C. R. Cirv. P. 43(k) (West Supp. 2003); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
2104 (McKinney Supp. 2004). Arizona provides that, if disputed, agreements are
binding only if made in writing or in open court and recorded. See AIz. R. Crv. P.
80(d) (2004). Missouri has provided that all ADR is nonbinding absent parties' writ-
ten agreements. See Mo. Sup. CT. R. 17.01(d) (2004).
284 Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
285 See generally Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected
Mediations-Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of
Public AdversarialJustice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL 509 (2004); JamesJ. Alfini &
Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of Emerging Case
Law, 54 ARK. L. REv. 171 (2001); Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agree-
ments: Contract Law Collides with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 33 (2001).
286 Autera, 419 F.2d at 1203; see also TCBY Systems, Inc. v. EGB Assocs., Inc., 2 F.3d
288 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting the "general rule" that evidentiary hearings are required
when "the existence or terms of the settlement agreement" are in dispute); Fisher
Brothers v. Phelps Dodge Indus., Inc., 614 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding an
evidentiary hearing to interpret a "most favored nations" clause); cf Michigan Regional
Council of Carpenters, 99 Fed. Appx. at 18-19 (declining to hold an evidentiary hearing
in part because of information that the judge had received at a status conference).
The court held that no evidentiary hearing was required, despite some "facial incon-
sistency" between a court order noting that the parties were "near settlement" and
another indicating that the matter had settled. Id. at 21 n.5. Parties who do not
request such hearings are not provided them as of right. See Calcor Space Facility,
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some oversight, through the lens of Due Process Procedure, because
court-based decisionmaking entails opportunities to be heard. 287
At least three sticking points have become plain in the years since
the D.C. Circuit's identification of the right to procedural due process
when disputes arise about the meaning of court-based settlements. A
first is the judgment call about when evidence is needed and whether,
even if evidence is needed, affidavits suffice. 288 One possibility is to
apply the approach of Rule 56 on summary judgment and to require
judges either to find that no material facts are in dispute or to take
evidence. 289 A second question is about the scope of the inquiry and
the kind of information understood to be relevant.290 The Federal
Rule on execution of judgments makes provisions for discovery, 291
raising issues about how much and what discovery will be permitted.
Yet another question is whether any rights to jury trials exist.
A third interrelated problem is the complexity of the position of
the judge who helped to settle a case and is then asked to rule on a
motion about a settlement. From case law reports, we know that trial
Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 5 Fed. Appx. 787 (9th Cir. 2001); Vaughn v. Sexton,
975 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1992).
287 Several decisions have required evidentiary hearings when disputes exist about
either the existence or material facts on the terms of settlements. See, e.g., Millner v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 643 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir. 1981); Mid-South Towing Co. v.
Har-Win, Inc. 733 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d
1491, 1496 (10th Cir. 1993); see also FED. R. Crv. P. 69(a) (providing that, in aid of
execution, judgment creditors may obtain discovery); FDIC v. LeGrand, 43 F.3d 163,
172 (5th Cir. 1995); Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Vafla Corp., 694 F.2d 246, 250 (1 lth Cir.
1982).
288 See, e.g., Bandera v. Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 51-55 (1st Cir. 2003) (requiring evi-
dence if material facts are in dispute and evaluating the evidence taken but also not-
ing that sometimes resolution may occur without evidence being taken); Stewart v.
M.D.F., Inc., 83 F.3d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1996) (declining to require a hearing given
affidavits that an attorney lacked authority to settle and little likelihood existed that
the settlement would be enforced).
289 For concern thatjudges are too readily granting summaryjudgment and hence
that a question exists about "which" summary judgment approach would be appropri-
ate, see Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment, supra note 18, at 1044-57.
290 For example, courts have considered statements made by parties to the press
and communications to others as evidence of the fact and terms of settlements. See,
e.g., Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 271 F.3d 633, 638-39 (6th Cir. 2001) (con-
sidering the public posture taken by parties, including press releases and communica-
tions to others); United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853
(9th Cir. 1992) (providing, with a majority and dissent, very different assessments of
the relevance and weight of information and documents and implications of the back-
ground facts of the litigation options).
291 See FED. R. Civ. P. 69.
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judges often take an "active role.., in clarifying" settlement terms.
292
Some judges serve as mediators and, after discussions, dictate the
terms of an agreement into the record.293 One view is that, given such
intimate involvement, such judges should recuse themselves from en-
forcement proceedings since that posture may put them in the posi-
tion of being both witness and judge. Similarly, should a judge who
helps to bring a settlement about subsequently make findings about
its existence and enforceability? If so, then appellate review of those
decisions (if sought) could rely on an exacting standard of review that
gives little or no deference to the position taken by the settling
judge.294 Whether judges should formally be called as witnesses (as
Judge Posner has suggested) 295 is another question, although one
must wonder whether that suggestion was a rhetorical flourish that the
realities of the power of the trial judge make implausible or useless.
V. LAw's BARGAINS
I hope that this overview has made plain that Contract Procedure
is now an integral aspect of contemporary civil litigation. The obliga-
tion to discuss settlement is imposed in national and local rules, shift-
ing the focus from adjudication to negotiation. The many problems
described above should also make plain that Contract Procedure can-
not avoid facing disputing parties. The challenges that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to solve, more than sixty years
ago, have not disappeared but rather returned in the context of sort-
ing out the facts and meaning of bargains. As judges rule over bar-
gaining, their legitimacy is put into question. How are they to justify
the interventions they make?
292 Brief for Respondents at *4, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375
(1994) (No. 93-263), available at 1994 WL 137026.
293 See Re/Max Int'l, 271 F.3d at 637 (describing the initial appointment of another
judge "to mediate settlement discussions with the parties," and that when such efforts
"proved unsuccessful," the judge assigned to the case "conducted mediation sessions
with the parties on" three days); id. at 639 (referring to the "transcript dictated by
Judge Gwin and agreed to by counsel and the parties in court" as the "complete settle-
ment of the parties"). Thereafter, the trial judge also gave a lengthy explanation of
why, in that judge's opinion, one party had settled after all the others. Id. at 637 n.2.
294 Cf Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 217 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2000) (ap-
plying a standard of clear error to findings of the existence of a settlement and a
standard of abuse of discretion to rulings on enforcement of settlements).
295 Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2002). We
(my research assistants and I) have not found a reported case in which such a proce-
dure took place, although in United States v. Newman, the decision describes a judge
making such an offer. See 982 F.2d 665, 670 n.6 (1st Cir. 1992).
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The growing law of settlement often reveals judges resorting to
type-returning to their role as adjudicators by providing opportuni-
ties for evidence and finding facts. But in many cases, the allure of
settlement overwhelms jurists, insisting on the existence of bargains
over parties' objections and ignoring their own investments in disposi-
tions without trial. Instead, when conflicts emerge either about settle-
ments made in or because of courts or about the qualities of privately
provided or agency-based processes, Contract Procedure has to return
to Due Process Procedure. 296 Here, my argument is that even as
much of the trans-substantive premises of the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have been eroded, at least one aspect of that trans-
substantive project needs to be preserved. The task ofjudging has to
be bounded by Due Process Procedure, for it offers the best account
of how to legitimate judicial action.
What I hope this review of current facets of Contract Procedure
also reveals is the need to do more than rely on the haphazard deci-
sionmaking, much of it in decisions marked "not for publication or
citation as precedent." Instead, a project like that which produced
the 1930s creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has to be
undertaken to face the normative questions so as to begin to sort cate-
gories and cases, to write rules captioned "settlement," to explain the
forms and kinds of bargains permitted, and to detail the position of
the judge over the life span of a settlement (as contrasted to the life
span of a lawsuit).
While these proposals implicate ambitions akin to efforts in the
1920s and 1930s to develop what was then a new form of civil proce-
dure, those working in the twenty-first century cannot assume the au-
tonomy of decisions about process from substantive agendas about the
meaning ofjustice. The deployment of process to achieve substantive
goals is deeply entrenched in the Constitution and regularly practiced
by politicians and rulemakers alike; ignoring the political and distribu-
tion consequences of procedural rulemaking is not possible now (if it
ever was).297 Given the stakes of judge-induced contracts, collective
296 Indeed, some proponents of ADR suggest that its deployment ought to be ac-
companied by incorporation of due process rights. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Con-
stitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public CivilJustice,
47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 960 (2000) (seeking to require "minimal but meaningful due
process standards in those dispute resolution hearings that are driven by state action"
such as court-enforced arbitration obligations).
297 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000) (requiring that procedural rules "shall not
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive rights"). See generally Robert G. Bone, The
Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking Democrat;c Legitimacy, and Procedural Effi-
[VOL. 8o:2
PROCEDURE AS CONTRACT
discussion is needed about both the content and the sources of the
law of Contract Procedure.
A central question for this federation is whether to support the
current trend-a federal common law of contract emerging through
the accretion of decisions on the law of settlement 29 8 -o-r whether
other bodies of government, state or federal, should make more of
the decisions. 299 Several years ago, Professors Carrington and Haagen
raised concerns that the Supreme Court had unwisely taken on the
task of federalizing arbitration law, weakening enforcement of federal
statutory rights and hence of national law more generally, and over-
legalizing commercial arbitration.3 00 During an era when the Su-
preme Court had appeared particularly attentive to state authority, it
nonetheless preempted state litigation rights, which were interpreted
to conflict with federal obligations to arbitrate. Similarly, Professor
Nancy King has drawn attention to the "remarkable development" in
criminal procedure that "rights and requirements previously consid-
ered inalienable, have become bargaining chips."30 1 Yet several of the
ciency, 87 CEO. L.J. 887 (1999);Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2219 (1989).
298 See, e.g., Monaghan v. SZE 33 Assocs., 73 F.3d 1276, 1283 (2d Cir. 1996) (as-
suming without deciding that state law governed and determining that state law would
enforce a settlement that did not comply with state law provisions because of one
party's reliance upon it); United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster, 962 F.2d
853, 856 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that even when federal causes of action are
concluded by settlement, interpretation of settlement agreements should be gov-
erned by state law).
Arbitration contracts governed by the FAA are interpreted under state law, ex-
cept when federal law preempts state law. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489
(1987) (concluding that the FAA created "a body of federal substantive law of arbi-
trability" that preempts contrary state law). The Court there noted that state law is
used "to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of con-
tracts generally." Id. at 492. The Court also noted that state courts could not rely on
the "uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that
enforcement would be unconscionable." Id. The recent spurt of federal and state
decisions addressing enforcement of arbitration contracts makes plain the complexity
of the question of what issues are for state and which are for federal lawmakers.
299 See, e.g., David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convo-
luted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35
U. RICH. L. REv. 1085 (2002) (calling for federal legislation to regulate the enforce-
ment and use of pre-litigation agreements).
300 See Carrington & Haagan, supra note 106, at 331-33.
301 King, supra note 200, at 114. There, King advocated that judges ought to be
required to identify third-party effects of bargains, such as concerns about too much
power residing in the Executive or the imposition of punishments that are dispropor-
tionate to the offense. Id. at 154-82.
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cases I have described and much of the commentary cited provide
evidence of unease about some of the consequences of that posture.
This body of material provides a means for policymakers to re-
turn to the question of whether, how much, and how to preclude ac-
cess to adjudication. Relevant sources of lawmaking include the state-
based Commissioners on Uniform Laws, federal rule drafters (making
new rules or borrowing state practices), specially-chartered commis-
sions, and state and federal legislators. Regulators need also to attend
to the obligations of lawyers, again an arena associated with the law of
agency and state-based ethical rules but today replete with law stem-
ming from a variety of sources and, increasingly, the federal rules and
statutes.
302
That more input into and more collective elaboration of the
processes of Contract Procedure are needed are the easy conclusions
from this analysis. The hardest issues for Contract Procedure (as they
are for Due Process Procedure) will be whether to try to craft a trans-
substantive set of answers, whether to respond to inter-litigant dispar-
ity in process options and outcomes, and whether to try to curb the
power of repeat players (civil and criminal) to set the parameters of
law's bargaining.
30 3
302 See generally Jeffrey A. Parness & Austin W. Bartlett, Unsettling Questions Regard-
ing Lawyer Civil Claim Settlement, 78 OR. L. REV. 1061 (1999).
303 See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead, supra note 83; see also IN LITIGA-
TION: DO THE "HAvES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey
eds., 2003).
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